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Abstract 
A patchwork of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements in the Americas has 
resulted from states attempting to secure and diversify their trading relations. 
Regionalism in the world economy has created trade blocs which are potentially 
exclusionary. Therefore, Ottawa has pushed for regional integration in the Americas, as 
Ottawa has claimed that it is in Canada's national interest to protect our economic 
interests in Latin America. Further pressure to pursue regional integration has also come 
from the corporate sector as free trade agreements protect and promote their growing 
interests in Latin America. Ottawa has been a leader in the pursuit of greater economic 
integration in the Americas, as illustrated by Ottawa's decision to sign a bilateral free 
trade agreement with Chile after its failure for accession to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), despite Chile's incomplete transition to democracy. 
Ottawa's rhetoric toward Central America and South Africa in the 1980s may lead 
one to believe that Ottawa also considers democracy and human rights promotion to be in 
Canada's national interest. Official government statements claimed that our foreign 
policy should represent Canada's social and political values. However, a closer look at 
Ottawa's actions reveals a foreign policy that continuously was based on economic self-
interest during the 1980s and in the 1990s. This provides an explanation why the 
Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement fails to address democracy and human rights issues 
in Chile. Ottawa will not jeopardize its economic and trade interests for the sake of 
democratic and human rights issues. 
In taking this stand, Ottawa has overlooked the link between democratic 
development and economic progress. Economic growth in Chile cannot continue without 
addressing the grave social problems that threaten Chile's transition to democracy. 
Instability in Chile would affect their economic growth. Now that Canada has a free trade 
agreement with Chile, we have an interest in their economic stability, therefore we also 
have an interest in their democratic stability. Policy makers in Ottawa have not looked 
out for Canada's 'national' interest as it is in our national interest to promote democratic 
stability in Chile. Democratic stability in Chile will ensure that both countries continue 
to grow and prosper under the free trade agreement. 
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Introduction 
The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) came into effect on July 5, 
1997, after Chile' s failed attempt for accession to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Chile, a country which in 1989 underwent a transition to democracy after 
sixteen years of military rule, was the next likely candidate for furthering economic 
integration in the Americas. Chile has enjoyed economic growth, beginning in the mid-
1980s under the Pinochet regime and has continued this growth under the new civilian 
governments. Chile ' s economic success has attracted the attention of Canadian investors 
and as a result Canada-Chile trade has dramatically increased in the past few years. 
The CCFT A has taken place within the context of regional integration, as well as 
during a period of democratic transition in Chile. As more regions throughout the world 
move toward trade blocs, Canada seeks to secure its position within the international 
economic system. The dynamic growth of Latin American economies has drawn the 
Canadian government's attention toward the region. As a result, the Canadian 
government has been creating greater economic links to Latin America in order to secure 
markets and trade. For Chile, the CCFTA helps secure economic growth which is an 
important factor for its future democratic stability. It adds legitimacy to the civilian 
government as it illustrates that they are able to maintain economic growth while at the 
same time addressing social issues. 
This thesis draws on two literatures, Canadian foreign policy and democratic 
transition and consolidation, to address the issues raised by the CCFT A. In doing so, it 
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provides an overview of the direction of Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s and how 
the Canadian government responds to a country undergoing a transition to democracy 
now that Ottawa is pushing for regional economic integration. To provide an overview of 
Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s, this thesis examines Ottawa's pro-human rights and 
democracy discourse of the 1980s to illustrate the disjuncture of its far more realist focus 
on promoting Canadian trade in the 1990s. The CCFT A also raises issues of Chile· s 
democratic stability and lack of democratic intent in the agreement. These issues are 
important as instability in Chile could affect Canada's economic interests in that country. 
To assess democratic stability in Chile, this thesis examines Chile ' s transition to 
democracy and the authoritarian elements in its politics which prevent the new civilian 
governments from consolidating democracy. 
By drawing on two separate literatures, the resulting work is neither a complete 
foreign policy study, or a democratic transition and consolidation study. Rather, it is a 
study that crosses these frontiers to illustrate the complexities of the CCFTA. For 
example, to consider why the CCFTA lacks democratic intent (regardless of whether this 
could actually have been included in the CCFTA or not) two issues need to be addressed. 
First, why is it important that democratic intent be included in the CCFTA? To answer 
this question, Chile's democratic transition needs to be examined to illustrate why it is 
important for both Chile and Canada. Second, why does the CCFT A lack democratic 
intent? The answer can be found in Canadian foreign policy literature as it provides an 
explanation as to why Ottawa has decided to ignore concerns about Chilean democracy. 
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The consolidation of democracy in Chile and its future stability should be 
important considerations for the Canadian government now that we have a free trade 
agreement with that country. However, addressing economic issues is not sufficient for 
democratic stability in Chile as .. democracy and the related issues of human rights, 
popular participation, and good governance are now widely seen as essential pillars of 
durable development.'' 1 Therefore, if Canada wants to ensure democratic and economic 
stability in Chile we must promote these objectives through our foreign and trade policy. 
In the 1980s Canada projected the image that it was concerned about democracy 
and human rights issues through its foreign policies toward Central America and South 
Africa. The government attributed the instability i..n Central America to social and 
economic problems, rather than communist-led subversion, as the US had done. The 
Department of External Affairs issued two policy reviews, the Final Report: Canada ·s 
Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in 1982 and Competitiveness and 
Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations in 1985, which stressed the 
importance of promoting human rights, democracy, and development assistance in the 
region. In South Africa, the Canadian government called for an end to apartheid as it 
was believed to be root problem for the growing outbreaks of violence. The government 
threatened that it would cut off economic ties if the minority white South African 
government did not change. 
'David Gillies, Between Principle and Practice: Human Righrs in North-South Relations. (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 1996) 17. 
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The image that Canada portrayed in the 1980s may lead one to believe that 
democracy and human rights issues have gained a higher priority in Canadian foreign 
policy. Furthermore, with advancements towards democracy in many Latin American 
countries and considering Canada's desire to promote regional integration throughout the 
Americas, it is natural to believe that Canada is interested in influencing the stability of 
democracy as it would have a positive effect on economic and trade relations. However, a 
closer look at Canadian policies in the 1980s, Canada's historical relations with Chi!e, 
and an examination of the CCFTA, demonstrates that Canadian foreign policy is guided 
by self-interest and has an economic and trade bias. In practice, Canada foreign policy 
does not live up to its rhetoric. 
It is important for Canada to consider human rights and democracy issues in Chile 
for economic as well as ethical reasons. Now that Canada has a free trade agreement with 
Chile we have a vested interest in Chile's economic stability as an economic downturn in 
Chile would have a negative effect on our trade relations. However, Chile's economic 
growth cannot continue without addressing the needs of the population and introducing 
the reforms necessary to further consolidate democracy. If the material needs of the 
population are not met and social unrest results, it could delegitimize the civilian 
government's efforts creating an opening for the military to take power. As David Gillies 
suggests: .. there is a growing appreciation that the fostering of democratic processes in 
government and society contributes to economic development by releasing creative 
energies, enhancing accountability, and deepening participation."2 Therefore, Canada 
also has a vested interest in Chile's capability to address the needs of its citizenry and 
introduce the necessary reforms to further consolidation of democracy. 
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Moreover, it is also essential for Canadian foreign policy to address democracy 
and human rights issues as our foreign policy should reflect the values of the country and 
Canada's middle power status. Canada is regarded as having similar foreign policies as 
the 'like-minded' states, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. And as David Gillies 
suggests: "These nations are less encumbered by global strategic troubles than the U.S. 
Gulliver and are less divided by a polarized domestic public. They should therefore be 
less compromised in their human rights statecraft."3 Furthermore, as a country regarded 
as a ·middle power', Canada is perceived as non-threatening and can .. also lead in certain 
"functional" niches where Canadians have acknowledged skills and interests.''"' Such 
areas of expertise for Canada include electoral observations, development assistance and 
peacekeeping. 
It is difficult for states to promote democracy and human rights issues because this 
requires involvement in the domestic concerns of another state. From a realist 
perspective, as Hans Morgenthau suggests, all states are sovereign, therefore, ·•no nation 
has the right, in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary, to tell any other nation 
!Ibid., 21. 
1Ibid., 8. 
"'Ibid., 11 
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what laws it should enact and enforce, let alone to enact and enforce them on the latter's 
territory. "5 A competing perspective, liberal internationalism, suggests "the idea that we 
both are and should be a part of a broader community than . . . the nation state. •'16 While it 
is difficult for states to promote democracy and human rights they do have the ability to 
influence such issues. As Robert Dahl suggests: ''Yet democratic countries could make a 
difference in the long run, I think, if they steadily pursued a policy of supporting changes 
in the direction of democracy and discouraging changes away from it . . .. Democratic 
coWltries could aim in the democratization of non-democratic coWl tries by steadily 
pursuing policies over many years that focus on changes in the underlying conditions that 
support stable polyarchy.''7 While it may be difficult for Canada to directly influence 
human rights and democracy issues in Chile, it is possible. 
Despite Canada's potential ability to promote democracy and human rights in 
Chile, Ottawa has failed to do so on a number of occasions. Canada failed to react to the 
overthrow of the Allende government and the military coup in 1973; Ottawa maintained 
relations with the Pinochet regime; unlike the Reagan administration, Ottawa did not 
become involved with the 1989 plebescite to ensure that the election was free and fair; 
and in the CCFT A there is no reference to democracy and human rights issues. Canada • s 
'Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace. 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1985) 331. 
6Gillies, Between Principle and Practice. 4. 
~As cited by, Graham R. Allison and Robert P. Beschel. ··can the United States Promote Democracy:• 
Political Science Quarterly 107, no.1 (1992) 86. 
relations with Chile have focused on business and trade interests as exemplified by their 
historical relations, as well as by the fact that during the negotiations for the CCFT A the 
advisory bodies were heavily weighted with representatives from the corporate sector. 
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Chapter I 
Canadian Foreign and Trade Policy in the 1990s 
Growing trade relations with Chile along with Canada's desire to further regional 
integration throughout the Americas, led the Canadian government to sign a free trade 
agreement with Chile. As the global economy moves toward the formation of regional 
trade blocs, Canada and Chile seek to secure markets and their place in the international 
economy. For Canadian investors, there are many areas of opportunity in Chile, such as 
mining, power and energy, forestry, information technology and telecommunications. 
agriculture, the fisheries, and the environment. For Chile, there are similar areas for 
Canadian investment, expertise and knowledge in su~h areas will benefit Chilean 
industries. 
Regional integration in the Americas is occurring, with agreements that vary in 
scope. There are many sub-regional trade agreements, such as Mercado Comun del Sur 
(!viERCOSUR} in South America or Central America Common Market (CACM} in 
Central America, in which a number of countries have agreed to various trade 
arrangements. There are also several bilateral trade agreements between countries. The 
NAFT A, and now the CCFT A, are the only agreements that create a free trade area along 
with labour and environmental side agreements. 
Efforts to create a western hemisphere trade area (WHFTA), which has come to 
be called the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas (FTAA), began with President George 
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Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 1990. It was intended to support 
economic reforms and help Latin American economies to put them on a level playing 
field so that in the long run a free trade area could be established in the western 
hemisphere. A FT AA "would be the largest trading region in the world with a combined 
GDP of more than $7.7 trillion."1 It has been proposed that a WHFTA be established by 
2005 . However, with varying levels of interest by countries, this may be difficult to 
achieve. 
Despite a decline in a US commitment to establish a WHFT A and a waning 
interest by some Latin American governments, the Canadian government remains an 
active promoter for regional integration. Although the Canadian government was initially 
hesitant to sign a free trade agreement with Mexico, Ottawa has now decided that because 
it has a trade agreement with Mexico it will continue to pursue free trade agreements with 
other countries. Canada, along with ··some Latin American countries (Mexico, Chile, and 
Colombia, among others) also recognize the need to prevent exclusive trade blocs and are 
moving in the same direction, generally speaking. "2 Chile presented itself as the next 
likely partner for a free trade agreement due to Chile's dynamic economic growth in the 
past few years. 
1Vilma Petrash. From Subregionalism to Inter-American Regionalism: NAFTA., MERCOSUR. and the 
··spirit of.'vliami" Universidad Central de Venezuela [http://www.powerandintegration.com/papers/SpiriLhtm] 
!Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Dosman eds., .. Introduction: The New Era in Canadian-Latin American 
Relations.·· Beyond Mexico. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995) 4. 
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The CCFTA therefore is a result of the Canadian government's policy to expand 
economic integration in the Americas. Chile initially sought accession to NAFT A. 
however it failed to be fast-tracked through the US Congress; that is, to be voted on as a 
package, without amendments. Ottawa then decided that it would move ahead and sign a 
bilateral free trade agreement with Chile. The free trade agreement with Chile may also 
provide future benefits for Canada in terms of gaining access to the rich markets in South 
America, namely Argentina and Brazil. Chile's associate membership in Mercosur gives 
Canada a window, or an eventual doorway, to that organization. 
Chile's economic potential can be illustrated by its growth in GDP and the growth 
ofGDP per capita. The 1990 growth rate was 3.5 percent, while the region as a whole 
experienced -0.3 percent.3 In the period between 1990 and 1995 Chile experienced its 
highest growth rate in 1992 with 7.3 percent, while the region was at 2. 7 percent:' The 
growth of GOP per capita has increased from Pinochet's economic policies as in 1990 the 
average annual rate was at 0.8 percent, while the region was at -2.2 percent. 5 Although in 
1995 Chile's GOP per capita remained the same, the region was experiencing a -1.5 
percent decrease.6 
JEconomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Statistical Yearbook For Latin America and 
rhe Caribbean. /996 ed. (Santiago: United Nations, 1997) 74. 
4Ibid .. 74. 
'Ibid., 75. 
6Ibid., 75. 
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Chile's recent economic growth has attracted international interest as the new 
civilian government managed to maintain economic growth while undergoing a transition 
to democracy. Chile is also of political importance to students of democratic transition 
and consolidation, due to its recent political history, which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter three. Chilean democracy came to an end in 1973 after the military coup, which 
was a response to the socialist policies of the Allende government. The Pinochet regime 
terrorized the country, until 1988 when a presidential plebiscite was held that elected 
General Augusto Pinochet out of power. In Latin America, only Uruguay has a recent 
history similar to Chile's, although Uruguay does not have constitutional holdovers. 
Uruguay is similar to Chile in that its democratic political culture saved the country from 
further military rule. ·•The voter's rejection of the military's constitutional project in 
1980, which would have perpetuated military dominance of even a civilian government. 
is the most concrete example of the value placed on democracy in Uruguay' s political 
culture."7 Although Chile has been undergoing a transition to democracy, the 
consolidation of democracy is not complete because there are many authoritarian 
holdovers which prevent the new civilian government from implementing the necessary 
reforms. 
The failure ofNAFTA and the CCFTA to adequately address democracy, human 
rights, and environmental issues is part of the debate over expanding or deepening 
7Martin Weinstein. -uruguay: The legislature and the Reconstitution of Democracy." Legis/arure and the 
New Democracies in Latin America. ed. David Close. (Boulder: lynne Reinner Publ., l995). 148. 
12 
regional integration. Some argue that regional integration should only take place at the 
economic level because free trade agreements are only about trade and not about the 
domestic issues of another country. However, Leonard Wavennan suggests that in order 
for all economies to improve under the free trade agreement there needs to be a ··ceding 
of sovereignty in areas of domestic policy where most countries (especially the U.S.) may 
be unwilling to yield."11 For Mexico and Chile, it is important to consider domestic issues 
as many fear that the corporate sector will reap the benefits of the agreement and this in 
tum will reinforce the authoritarian elements of their political systems making it difficult 
to implement the necessary reforms for democracy. 
As trade and investments increase, the NAFTA and the CCFTA will have to 
deepen in a number of ways, which can be achieved by setting standards, harmonizing 
environmental practices, upgrading workplace standards, and consulting about future 
policies.9 ·•NAFT A is in some crucial ways incomplete as it leaves domestic policies in 
place, policies which can be equivalent non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The ability of 
NAFTA to survive will depend on the ultimate desires of the three national governments 
to respond to growing non-tariffbarriers." 10 It is important for future economic 
prosperity in Canada and the Americas to have a deepening of regional integration so that 
1Leonard Waverman, ··Post- NAFTA: Can the United States, Canada and Mexico Deepen their Economic 
Relationship?" Beyond Mexico ed. Jean Daudelin and Edgar Dosman. {Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995) 57. 
"M. Delal Baer and Sidney Weintraub, ·"fhe Pressure for Political Reform in Mexico." The NAFTA Debate: 
Grappling with unconventional Trade Issues. ed. M. Delal Baer and Sidney Weintraub. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publ.. 1994) 178. 
10Waverman, ·•Post- NAFTA", 56. 
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it would level out the playing field by furthering the consolidation of democracy. There 
cannot be economic liberalization in the absence of political liberalization. However, the 
NAFTA and the CCFTA exemplify Ottawa's policy to expand integration only at the 
economic level. 
It is important for the free trade negotiations to include political issues, for 
example, democracy because political instability, such as protests, strikes, and violence, 
could be caused by the lack of democratic development. This could affect that coW1try ' s 
future economic stability, threatening foreign trade and investments. Any colUltry which 
has significant economic ties with that COWltry risks economic losses. 
Future regional integration would be strengthened by addressing democracy issues 
in free trade negotiations as "political issues are intrinsically embedded in processes of 
integration and that effective management of political challenges is essential to the long-
nm success of integration schemes."11 Addressing political issues in free trade 
negotiations would deepen relations by strengthening economic integration. Greater 
policy coordination in areas such as macroeconomics, labour and human rights, 
environmental protection, and democracy issues would increase the economic benefits of 
free trade by reducing non-tariff barriers such as low cost labour, lax environmental 
regulations, and minimal social services, such as health, education and poverty reduction 
policies. Also, the 
11 Peter H. Smith. eeL ·•The Politics oflntegration: Guidelines for Policy." The Challenge of Integration: 
Europe and the Americas. (Miami: University of Miami, North-South Centre, 1993) 391. 
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insistence on democracy bas practical as well as normative advantages: 
democracies strengthen regional security, since they tend not to make war with 
each other, and they foster economic reliability, since they tend to comply with 
legal and international obligations. Precisely for these reasons, the question of 
democracy should not be avoided or postponed; it should be addressed early and 
clearly. 12 
Regional Economic Integration 
Regional integration and hemispheric trade have been accelerating in the western 
emisphere during the past decade. Economic and political advancements in Latin 
American countries have prompted open trading policies focusing on the importance of 
exports and international competitiveness. With the increase of regional free trade blocs 
occurring throughout the world (such as the European Union, Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (A SEAN) in Southeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) in the Asia-Pacific region) the Western Hemisphere countries are moving toward 
their own free trade agreements. As a result, economic integration is taking place. It has 
emerged at the subregional level rather than regional due to the immense economic 
differences between the north and the south. 
In South America there is MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, CARICOM in the 
Caribbean, CACM in Central America, and NAFT A in North America. There are alsn a 
number of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral free trade agreements between countries 
121bid., 404. 
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that vary in scope. For example, Mexico has free trade agreements with Chile, Costa 
Rica and Bolivia. Chile also has various trade agreements with Venezuela, Argentina, 
Mexico, Brazil, Columbia and Canada. 13 In 1990 President Bush announced the EAI 
which envisioned, in the long-run, a hemispheric free trade zone throughout the 
Americas. And in 1996, the Summit of the Americas was held in Miami where 
government leaders promoted the idea of an FT AA. Government leaders in the Americas 
are promoting the idea of a hemispheric free trade area; however, there are differing 
opinions as to which method should be used to achieve it. 
The devastating effects of the ISI policies 14 left Latin American countries with 
huge external debts, high inflation, increased capital flight, low growth rates, rising 
unemployment, falling real wages, and declining social conditions. They had economic 
systems that were inward looking and state controlled at a time when the rest of the world 
was moving toward open economic policies. Since the late 1980s, Latin American 
countries have improved economically and the political crisis that gripped the region has 
subsided. 
A study by the Inter-American Development Bank indicated that if the current 
economic reform process continues, annual growth rates should be between 3.9% and 
13Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffery J. Schon. Western Hemisphere Economic Integration (Washington: 
lnstitute for International Economics, 1994) 225-228. 
14lmpon Substirution Industrialization Policies erected high tari..tfbaniers to protect local industries that 
produced conslUDer goods from foreign competition. New industries generated little employment and as local artisan 
industries were forced out of business poverty increased. Liisa North, Between War and Peace in Central America: 
Choices for Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990) 30. 
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5.2% in the major South American economies for the rest of the decade. 15 Recently, 
Latin American governments have adopted outward looking economic policies that focus 
on expanding the private sector, reducing government intervention, increasing exports, 
and many have unilaterally lowered tariffs and trade barriers. Many countries have also 
undergone some form of democratization which has added to the legitimacy of their 
commitment to economic change. 
In June 1990 US President Bush announced the EAI. It was intended to promote 
economic reform in Latin America, provide debt relief, assist in trade and investment 
liberalization, and in the long-run, establish a WHFTA. The Latin American 
governments welcomed the EAI, as it was a symbol of US commitment to the region at a 
time when regional trade blocs throughout the world were threatening to become 
exclusionary and thus, leaving Latin American countries with limited international 
markets. The EAI therefore signalled to Latin Americans that they would not be left out 
in the cold. Gary Hufbauer and Jeffery Schott in Western Hemisphere Economic 
Integration state that the EAI sought to promote the flow of foreign capital to the region 
in order to relieve the debt crisis; show US support for emerging the market-based 
reforms; assure the region it was still important to the US at a time when the Soviet 
•~conrad Sheck et al., "The Americas in Transformation" Policy Staff Paper, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/englishlforeignp/dfaitlpolicy papers/94 06 e/s Shtml] 
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Union appeared to be its sole preoccupation; to assure Latin American countries that they 
would not be forgotten as the US began free trade negotiations with Mexico. 16 
Under the EAI a number of bilateral framework agreements have been established 
between the US and all Latin American and Caribbean countries, except Haiti, Surinam, 
and Cuba. The agreements ·•generally contain a statement of principles covering: the 
benefits of open trade and investment; the increasing importance of services in the 
economy; the need for adequate protection of intellectual property rights; the importance 
of observing and promoting internationally recognized workers' rights; and the 
desirability of effectively resolving trade and investment problems."17 The agreements 
are a basic way to promote economic reforms and free trade. 
To encourage investment, there are two programs to be administered by the lnter-
American Development Bank (IADB). One program is to ·•create a new policy-based 
lending program to promote the reform of investment regimes. The program would 
provide both technical advice and financial support for privatization efforts and the 
liberalization of investment regimes." 18 Chile received $150 million in June 1991, which 
was the first Loan approved. 19 The second program proposed is a ·•multilateral investment 
'bHufbauer and Schott, Western Hemisphere Economic Integration, 15. 
17Jeffrey J. Schott and Gary C. Hufbauer, .. Free Trade Areas, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. and 
!he Multilateral Trading System:' Srrategic Options For Latin America in the 1990s. ed. Colin Bradford. (France: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1992) 256. 
11Roger Porter, .. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: A New Approach to Economic Growth." 
Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 32, no.4, ( 1990) 7-8. 
'~utbauer and Schon. '"Free Trade Areas" 257. 
fund, to which the United States, the European Community, and Japan would each 
contribute $100 million annually over the next five years beginning in 1992.20 
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The EAI also intended to provide debt relief. To do this the EAI "proposes an 
Enterprise for the Americas Facility administered by the US Treasury Department. Debt 
reduction, investment reform, and environmental protection are all part of the package.'':! I 
ln order to receive support from the Facility, countries must first meet a number of 
criteria. These include implementing reform programs of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) or World Bank, adopting major investment reforms, and negotiating a 
satisfactory financing program with commercial banks.12 By December 1992, ''$1.1 
billion in Inter-American Development Bank investment-sector loans to eight countries 
and $303 million of debt reduction to five countries had been approved."13 
Despite initial optimism and ambitious aims of the EAI, it has had little success. It 
has done ''little more than reinforce ongoing trade and investment reforms and accelerate 
subregional efforts toward integration. "14 Although the EAI was generally well received 
by Latin American and Caribbean governments, it was a unilateral act that lacked prior 
consultation with other governments. The Initiative was also regarded as too ambitious, 
!Oibid., 258. 
1lfuid .• 258. 
uPorter, "'The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.'' 8. 
nHutbauer and Schott, Western Hemisphere Economic Inregration, 2. 
! 4 Ibid., 2. 
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as Vilma Petrash notes: "The too ambitious objectives of the EAI which, along with the 
lip-service support paid by the Bush administration to the EAI, may well explain the 
reduced coordination shown by the U.S. government agencies encharged with its 
irnplementation.":5 In October 1991 the U.S. House of Representatives rejected the 
Foreign Aid Authorization Bill of 1991, which incorporated the EAI Act of 199l.l6 Other 
uncertainties also surrounded the motivation behind the EAI as some believed that 
Mexico ' s accession to NAFTA was a result of its ·special relationship' with the US, 
which the other countries lacked.17 Furthermore, the delay ofNAFTA's ratification. the 
political and social crisis that hit Mexico shortly after the ratification ofNAFT A, and the 
long list of obligations that other countries had to meet in order to be considered for 
accession to NAFTA created wtcertainty and second thoughts to many Latin American 
and Caribbean governments.18 
In 1991, after the announcement of the EAI, MERCOSUR was established with 
the signing of the Treaty of Aswtcion. It consisted of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. Chile and Bolivia joined in 1996 as associate members. This agreement 
consisted of'"the establishment of a common market involving the ·free movement of 
goods, services and factors of production' among member states, the establishment of a 
!'Petrash. From Subregiona/ism to Inter-American Regionalism, 6. 
~0Schott and Hutbauer, ·'Free Trade Areas, " 268 . 
.:7Petrash. From Subregionalism to Inter-American Regionalism, 6. 
~·Ibid., 6. 
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common external tariff ( CEn, the adoption of a common trade policy and the 
coordination of economic and sectoral policies. "29 Two administrative bodies were also 
established: the Common Market Council oversees the general policies of the agreement, 
and the Common Market Group oversees "the operation of 10 working groups on trade, 
regulatory, and macroeconomic issues between the countries.''30 MERCOSUR was a 
significant move toward subregional integration as the four member countries ·•comprise 
nearly one-halfofLatin America's gross domestic product, more than 40 percent of its 
total population, and about one-third of its foreign trade. "31 
Also embodied in the agreement was the notion that through increased economic 
integration, peace and political stability would be sustained. 32 It was thought that by 
increasing interdependence in the region, the costs of instability would be high, therefore 
everyone would have a vested interest in maintaining stability. As Felix Pena stated, 
MERCOSUR is ··not simply an economic project ... although its principle measures 
related to trade, production, and investment, it transcends economics and penetrates the 
broadest of political issues. "33 
1~eith Christie. The Four Amigos and Beyond: Towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
[http:/ /www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/englishlforeignp/dfait/policy-1 /1995/part 1_1 O.htm) 
30Hutbauer and Schott, Western Hemisphere Economic Integration, 106. 
31 Peter Smith, ed. "The Politics of Integration: Concepts and Themes." The Challenge of Integration: 
Europe and the Americas. (Miami: University of Miami, North-South Centre, 1993) 8-9. 
321bid., 9. 
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In theory, MERCOSUR sets out an ambitious agenda for further economic 
integration and free trade. In reality, it has not accomplished what it set out to do. Its 
initial intent of eliminating tariffs and removing all non-tariff barriers to intra-regional 
trade by January 1995 was not reached because it was extended for another four years and 
approximately 200 non-tariffbarriers remain in place.34 Also, it is not as comprehensive 
as the NAFT A, as it does not include cross-border trade in services, intellectual property 
rights, product standards and regulations or government procurement. 35 
With the NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR in South America, and the 
other various free trade agreements in the Americas, there is an interest in further 
economic integration by all government leaders. Further integration cannot begin until 
other countries meet some requirements that put them all on a level playing field. Many 
of the Latin American and Caribbean countries are interested in further integration 
because it would secure access to US markets. A hemispheric free trade area in the 
Americas would combine GDP of more than $7.7 trillion. It would be the largest free 
trade area in the world. 
A Swnmit was held in Miami in December 1994 to promote the idea of a Free 
Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA). Negotiations for the agreement are to be 
completed by 2005. Government leaders signed a Declaration of Principles, ''to promote 
and strengthen democratic governance, prosperity through economic integration and free 
~Christie, The Four Amigos and Beyond, 10. 
Hlbid., 10. 
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trade, the eradication of poverty and discrimination, and sustainable development. "36 
They also signed a 'Plan of Action' outlining specific measures governments would use 
to meet the requirements of the Declaration and an FT AA. 37 Although all government 
leaders are interested in creating a FT AA, there are differing opinions and options as to 
how it should be achieved. 
Brazil is hesitant toward creating an FT AA. especially one centered on NAFT A. 
Brazil currently enjoys the position of the "hub' in South America, because it is the 
largest economy and has the largest population. However, Brazil is reluctant to ·•engage 
internationally on deep liberalization with regard to investment, trade in services and 
government procurement."38 As a member ofMERCOSUR, this has created a problem in 
establishing a common external tariff because Argentina has an open economy.39 This 
suggests that Brazil would be reluctant to accept the obligations ofNAFTA. Brazil 
would rather establish a free trade area in South America and use it as a counterweight to 
the NAFT A and better their negotiating position with the US . .w 
An FTAA centered around NAFTA is questionable given recent events. Mexico's 
economic and social crisis after the ratification ofNAFTA has placed doubts in the minds 
H•Petrash, From Subregionalism to Inter-American Regionalism, 9. 
17 Ibid .• 9. 
31Christie, The Four Amigos and Beyond, 20. 
19 Alberto van Klavern, The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas. ed. Peter Smith (Miami: 
University of Miami, North-South Centre, 1993) 123 . 
.iOpenasb., From Subregionalism to Inter-American Regionalism, 35. 
of Latin American leaders. Also, the fact that Chile failed to acceed to NAFT A because 
ofthe failure of its application to be fast-tracked through US Congress raises questions 
concerning the US's commitment to the idea of an FTAA. However, an FTAA centred 
around NAFT A would be an advantage, given the access to US markets, simplified 
trading practices, and the preservation of each member's capacity to maintain its own 
tariffs to non-member states.41 
23 
Although the US commitment to an FT AA has waned, Canada remains an active 
player. Canada's decision to seek a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile was a result 
ofChile's failure to be allowed to join NAFTA and Canadian and Chilean desire to 
further economic integration. Chile's interest in expanding economic integration is also 
demonstrated by Chile's decision to join MERCOSUR as an observer in 1991. Chile's 
growing economy and its transition to democracy provides stability in South America, a 
region historically plagued with political instability and economic disparities. 
Canada-Chile Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) 
Trade between Canada and Chile has expanded in the past few years. Two-way 
trade between Canada and Chile has doubled over the past decade from $202.4 million in 
~'Ibid., 10. 
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1983 to $552.5 million in 199442 and in 1996 it reached a high of$760 million.43 Since 
1983, "Canadian exports of wheat, pulp and paper machinery, telecommunications and 
mining equipment, automotive parts and steel products have increased by several hundred 
percent.'""' The actual and planned investment in Chile by Canadian investors is 
approximately $7 billion.45 There are also "more than 50 Chile-Canada joint ventures 
operating in Chile, ranging from fighting forest fires to building industrial machinery."46 
In 1994, ··canadian exports to Chile were $314.4 million, an increase of almost 50 per 
cent from 1993.'''47 The table below indicates Canada-Chilean exports for 1996. In 1996 
Chilean exports to Canada reached $342.0 million and Canadian exports reached $330 
million which is an increase from 1994. Chile's immense economic improvements and 
the increase in trade between Canada and Chile promoted the signing of the bilateral free 
trade agreement. 
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Chilean Exports to Canada 
Table 1.1 
Canada-Chile Trade41 
1996 
Products/Chapter (Million$ Cdn) 
Edible fruit + nuts 124.3 
Ores, Slag,+Ash 88.6 
Beverages, spirits 38.5 
Processed fruits + 
vegetables 21.4 
Residues + waste from 
food industry (fishmeal) 18.9 
Fish+crustaceans I 0.3 
lnorganic chemicals 7.2 
Iron+steel 5.5 
Pulp of wood 4. 7 
Fertilisers 2.5 
Total Exports to Canada: 342.0 
*Includes Canadian Re-exports 
Source: Statistics Canada 
25 
Canadian Exports to Chile 
Products/Chapter (Million$ Cdn) 
Cereals 71.7 
Nuclear reactors, boilers 
mechanical appliances 48.3 
Electrical machinery. 
equipment parts 44.8 
Mineral fuels, oils 
+products of 
their distillation 24.6 
Salt, sulphur. earth+stone, 
plastering material, lime+ 
cement 14.6 
Vehicle parts+accessories 14.0 
Special Classification 
Provisions 9.4 
Articles of Iron+Steel 8.6 
Edible vegtables 7.1 
Total Exports to Chile: 330.0* 
The Canadian Export Development Corporation (EDC) is open for business in 
Chile with no restrictions and provides a ''variety of financing services to Canadian 
businesses, including direct buyer loans, leasing, note purchases, pre-shipment, and 
project financing.'""9 For Canadian businesses there are many prospects for investment in 
41Chile Business Update ... Summary Chile-Canada Trade'\ 
[hnp:/fvvww.chiletrade.cl/chiletradelnewslttr.004/index.hunl] 
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mining as it accounts for 8 percent ofGDP in Chile; forestry accounts for 14.4 percent of 
Chile's total exports; agriculture and food accounts for 7 percent ofGDP; fisheries 
accounts for 1 to 2 percent of GDP; and information and technology and 
telecommunications is promising given privatization and deregulation of the industry.50 
Chile 's open economy, minimal regulations, and few government subsidies, created a 
favourable investment climate which led to Canada offering Chile a free trade deal. 
For Chile, Canada is an important trade partner because Canada has ··an excellent 
reputation in Chile as a reliable supplier of advanced technology and products, enhancing 
the potential for sales of goods and services and for technology transfer."s1 For Canadian 
businesses there are many sectoral opportunities. In mining, Chile is the world's largest 
copper producer and exporter, and is also the largest producer and exporter of potassium 
and sodium nitrate. 52 Chile imports mining equipment, therefore Canada has an 
opportunity as a supplier that has ••greatly enhanced the potential for sales and technology 
transfers with Canadian companies."53 Currently, Canada is Chile's ·•largest foreign 
investor in the mining sector, with over a US$ billion in actual and planned 
investment. "54 
!Olbid. 
51 Ibid. 
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In the forestry sector, opportunities for Canadian business can be found in such 
areas as: ''silviculture; treeharvesting and logging; sawmilling engineering and 
equipment; lumber drying kilns; chipping equipment; lumber remanufacturing 
engineering and equipment; and pulp and paper machinery and equipment ... forest fire 
fighting, environmental studies, pest control, and forestry operations safety equipment.''55 
Canadian interests in the power and energy sectors are also significant because '"the 
availability of natural gas in Chile should lead to considerable effort to convert existing 
processing plants from coal/fuel to direct-fired natural gas, especially in the forestry (pulp 
and paper), mining, fisheries and food processing industries."56 Opportunities also exist 
in: ''natural gas residential heating systems; household appliances such as dyers and 
overs; conversion of buses and taxis to natural gas; consulting engineering services; and 
pipeline construction. "S7 
In the information technology and telecommunications sector, opportunities are 
present due to the privatization and deregulation of the industry.58 These include: 
"cartographic surveying, aerial photography, geophysical surveying, satellite-based 
! 5Deparnnent of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. ·'Chilean Forestry Sector Overview". 
[http:/ /www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/geolladch-fores.han] 
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imaging, global information systems, radar imaging, urban planning systems, and global 
positioning systems. "s9 
Chile's imports of wheat ( durum and spring), lentils, peas, canary seed, tobacco, 
dairy products, processed foods, confectionary items, meat products and animal genetics 
are primarily from Canada.60 For Canada, this translates into an increase in business in 
these areas. 
In the environmental sector, opportunities are enhanced by the environmental side 
agreement to the CCFTA. The Chilean government has been attempting to improve its 
environmental regulations and this provides Canada with the opportunity to share its 
expertise in environmental legislation and knowledge. 
Prior to the beginning of the negotiations to the Canada-Chile bilateral free trade 
agreement, a number of Canadian Ministers made official visits to Chile. In January 
1995, Prime Jean Minister Chretien headed the first ever trade delegation to Chile. Over 
250 business people accompanied the Prime Minister and ·•business deals worth $1.7 
billion ($918 million in contracts and $846 million in agreements in principle) involving 
33 Canadian companies were signed.''l61 Also during this visit, a number of new 
agreements and memoranda of understanding were signed: the Canada-Chile Permanent 
oaoF AIT ... Focus On Chile .. , 
"'Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ... Canada-Chile Relations Sept.97" 
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Binational Commission on political, economic, and commercial relations; Business 
Council on National Issues signed a strategic alliance with the 'Confederacion de la 
Produccion y del Comerico' to foster direct business to business linkages within the 
context ofNAFT A; new environmental and telecommunication memoranda of 
understanding were signed; transportation memorandum were also signed.62 Other official 
visits included the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, the Secretary of State, the 
Minister of International Trade, the Minister of Transport, and the Minister of 
Environment. 
Negotiations for the CCFT A began in January 1996 after Chile's failed attempt 
for accession to NAFTA. The negotiations were conducted under the direction of the 
DFAIT.63 The Minister of international Trade received advice from industrial lobbyists 
and two appointed bodies: the International Trade Advisory Committee and a number of 
Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade.64 Both of these advisory bodies were 
heavily weighted with representatives from the corporate sector.65 According to David 
Robinson, Research Coordinator for the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the 
negotiations were held in secret, therefore not much information is available on the 
o:DFAIT. ~canada-Cille Trade and Investment Relations." 
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process.66 One stumbling block was removed when the Canadian government managed to 
negotiate "relief from the Chilean central bank's power to demand a 30 percent reserve 
deposit on foreign investment.'>67 This will allow Canadian investors to be exempt from 
Chile's requirement that 30 percent of their capital remain in the colllltry.68 
After several rounds of negotiations, Prime Minster Chretien and President Eduardo 
Frei signed the CCFT A in Ottawa on November 18, 1996. Also during Frei' s visit, the side 
agreements on the Environment and Labour were signed. As well as, "'the Social Security 
Agreement and an MOU [memoranda ofllllderstanding] on cooperation between the CIDA 
[Canadian International Development Agency] and its Chilean cotmterparts were signed."69 
The agreement came into effect on July 5, 1997. 
The CCIT A is closely patterned on the NAFT A, because it is intended to provide a 
bridge to Chile's accession to the NAFTA. '"The interim bilateral agreement will be 
compatible with current NAFT A provisions and will encompass trade in goods, services, 
investment, dispute settlement mechanisms, and side agreements on labour and 
environmental cooperation."70 The purpose of the CCFTA is to eliminate most tariffs and 
"Ibid. 
"'Gelkopf. ··The Canada·Chile Free Trade Agreement: Linking North and South America." 
101 Ibid. 
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non-tariff trade barriers on goods traded between two countries.71 There will be ''immediate 
duty-free access for 80 percent of Canadian exports to Chile and elimination of Chile's ll 
percent import duty on almost all remaining industrial and resource-based goods over five 
years.'.n The CCFTA also contains a '"mutual elimination of anti-dumping duties within a 
maximum of six years."73 It is Chile's hope that this agreement will lay the groundwork for 
their accession to the NAFT A. 
The objectives of the agreement are presented in Part One: General Part, Chapter A 
of the Canada-Chile Trade Agreement. Article A-02: Objectives states: 
l. The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its 
principles and rules, including national treatment, most favoured-nation treatment and 
transparency, are to: 
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, 
goods and services between the territories of the Parties; 
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; 
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the 
Parties; 
(d) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this 
Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and 
(e) establish a framework for further bilateral, regional and multilateral 
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement. 74 
11Gelkopf. ·•The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Linking North and South America." 
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The CCFT A also contains dispute settlement panels. The Free Trade Commission 
and the FT A Secretariat "are intended to resolve problems through joint decision making and 
effective dispute resolution. with both countries having an equal voice."75 This will resolve 
any disputes that may arise. In case of extraordinary circumstances, there are emergency 
safeguards which protect a country from the other country imposing ''import measures that 
may significantly divert trade. "76 The dispute settlement panels and the safeguards provide 
both cotmtries with protection. 
The Labour and Environment Agreements on Cooperation were signed on February 
6, 1977. The Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation is similar to the North 
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation. 77 The Labour Agreement: "Builds on the 
commitment of the Preamble to the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA): to ··improve 
working conditions and living standards" in both cotmtries; and to ''protect, enhance and 
enforce basic workers' rights."78 In order to fulfill the requirements of the agreement and to 
assure adherence to the Labour agreement the following will be established: a Commission 
for Labour Cooperation; a Cooperative Work Program; cooperative consultations and 
independent evaluations; and a dispute resolution process.7<) In a Press Release issued by the 
15DFA1T. "Focus On Chile.'' 
nDepartment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Highlights of the Canada-Chile Agreement on 
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Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the government stated: 
.. The Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation reflects the will of both countries to 
improve working conditions and living standards and to protect, enhance and enforce basic 
workers' rights, in the areas of freedom of association and the right to organize, employment 
standards and occupational safety and health standards. "80 
The Environmental Cooperation Agreement is similar to the Environmental 
Agreement in the NAFT A. The Environmental Agreement will ensure that Canada and 
Chile .. effectively enforce their environmental laws and to cooperate on environmental 
matters."81 As a result of Chile's minimal environmental regulations, there will be a 
transition period of two years in order for Chile to meet the requirements of the 
Environmental Agreement.82 The Environment Agreement establishes a Canada-Chile 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation which will: act as a forum for discussions; 
oversee the implementation of the agreement and recommendations; promote and facilitate 
cooperation between parties on environmental matters; and act as advisors for interpretation 
of the environmental agreement.83 Citizens and non-governmental organizations will also 
be able to ·'make submissions should they believe governments have failed to effectively 
10Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ... Canada Signs Environmental and Labour 
Agreements with Chile." Press Release, February 6, /997, 
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enforce environmental laws. These submissions will be evaluated by an independent panel, 
the Joint Submissions Committee, and a factual record may be prepared."84 
The CCFf A and the NAFf A are similar in most areas such as the custom procedures 
and the rules of origin. However, there are a few modified provisions. The 'rules of origin' 
are "'to determine whether a particular good qualifies for preferential treatment so as to 
prevent goods from other countries from gaining preferential access. "85 The rules of origin 
differ in the CCFT A as, '"the rules of origin for certain manufactured products have been 
relaxed on a transitional basis."86 Other variations are in areas such as cultural industries; 
social services~ over-quota tariffs for supply-managed products; and terms of the Auto Pact 
which are excluded from the CCFTA.87 
Opposition to the CCFT A was similar to what arose in response to NAFT A because 
critics believed that the labour and environmental side agreements were toothless. 
Opposition groups argued that the Canadian government was putting economics ahead of 
democracy and hwnan rights. Critics of the CCFT A argued that Canada should have waited 
to sign a free trade agreement with Chile until significant reforms took place within Chile. 
Due to the authoritarian holdovers from the Pinochet regime, social, labour, and 
environmental reforms have been slow. Opponents argued that by waiting, the Canadian 
"Ibid. 
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government would have put pressure on those groups opposing change within Chile. Chilean 
organizations such as the 'Chilean Action Network for an Initiative of the People', the 
·National Network of Ecological Action', and the 'Union Coordinating Committee on 
NAFTA and Other Trade Blocs', urged the Canadian government to postpone the signing of 
the agreement until labour laws were changed in Chile.88 Environmental groups in Chile also 
believe that the CCFT A will produce greater environmental costs because enforceable 
clauses are absent from the body of the agreement.89 Many Chileans fear that the agreement 
will entrench the outdated social, labour and environmental laws. 
Within Canada, opposition to the CCFT A arose from labour and environmental 
groups such as the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the Canadian Autoworkers Union 
(CAU), United Steelworkers, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, the Coalition 
for Economic Justice, the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia, and a 
coalition of various groups called Common Frontiers. Although these groups sought to 
influence the government during the negotiations their success was limited. The CLC issued 
a letter to the Trade Minister and also worked with groups in Chile to resist the deal.90 Bob 
White, of the CLC, stated the CLC ••is willing to support a bilateral trade arrangement with 
11Rachel Hays ... Canadians, Chilean Groups Forge Cross-Border Links." Borderlines 5, no.l, ( 1997) 
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Chile, provided that it advances the interests of working people in both countries. "91 While 
acknowledging the difficulties facing the Chilean workers, Lawrence McBrearty, USWA 
Canadian Director, argued that the CCFT A is also damaging for Canadian workers. He 
asserts that: .. Employers frequently use examples of off-shore regulations and low standards 
to cool off bargaining demands in Canada. Most of the examples cited in bargaining are 
newly developing economies like that ofChile.''l92 Also, as Bob White states: .. For example, 
much higher health and safety standards in British Columbia forest and mining industries are 
placed under severe downward pressure when mining companies are relocating to Chile. "'~3 
Other critics argue that the environmental side agreement is not sufficient for maintaining 
and enforcing environmental standards. They believe that the low environmental standards 
in Chile will force Canada to lower its own standards. 
Conclusion 
Although the CCFT A contains a labour and environment side agreement, it is more 
rhetoric than a plan for action. An absence of democratic intent in the CCFTA is a result of 
Canadian foreign policy focusing on self-interest. Ottawa does not want to be left out in the 
cold as the world economy moves toward the formation of exclusionary trade blocs. 
41 Bob White ... Canada-Chile Trade Talks Provide Oppommity to Define New Model."' Common Frontiers, 
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Therefore, Canada is pursuing economic integration in the Americas to secure markets and 
its place in the world economy. An increase in foreign investments and trade in Latin 
America has resulted in the corporate sector playing an important role in the formation of 
Canadian foreign policy. Civil society, labour and environmental groups have had little 
input in Canada's policies, as illustrated by their absence in the negotiations for the CCFfA. 
It is unlikely that the Chilean government would have been prepared to incorporate 
democratic intent in the CCFT A because there are too many reforms necessary that would 
have been disliked by the right and corporate sector. However, the problem is that the 
CCFf A reinforces a status quo that has distinctly non-democratic elements to it. For Chile, 
it is important to consider democratic issues in the free trade agreement because the 
consolidation of democracy there is uncertain. Chileans fear that the economic benefits of 
the trade agreement will reinforce the presently existing poor working conditions, low wages, 
and environmental degradation.94 
The Canadian govenunent's policy of expanding regional integration at the 
economic level instead of deepening existing relations with partner countries will create an 
unequal playing field. Deepening relations would include greater policy coordination and 
harmonization in domestic areas, such as political, social, labour, and environmental areas. 
However, by failing to address the importance of deepening relations it creates non-tariff 
9-IChilean Action Network for an Initiative of the Countries, et al. ''Open Letter from Chile to Canadian 
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barriers,95 such as lower wages, lax environmental regulations, and minimal social services. 
In turn, this may put pressure on Canada to lower its standards in order to remain 
competitive. Therefore, growth in trade and investments requires harmonization of policies 
in such areas. 
There is reason to believe that the Canadian government incorporates human rights 
and democracy issues in its foreign policy. Since the 1980s Canadian participation in such 
organizations as the Organization of America States (OAS) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, has increased. Canadian rhetoric has also focused on issues that 
concern the western hemisphere, such as democratic development, OAS reform, human 
rights, hemispheric security, economic cooperation, women's rights, drug trafficking, and 
the environment.96 As Peter McKenna points out: ·•In the area ofhwnan rights, Canada still 
remains interested and committed - at least in the sphere of rhetoric. "97 
During the 1980s, Ottawa's rhetoric focused on the importance of peace and 
democracy in Central America. Ottawa felt that the instability in Central America was 
caused by political, social, and economic instability, rather than being part of the East-West 
conflict, as the US had done. Ottawa also voiced it concerns over apartheid in South Africa 
and called on the South African government to change its domestic policies. However, 
~5Wavennan, ··Post-NAFT A", 56. 
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Ottawa's concerns about democracy and human rights issues were expressed more strongly 
in words than in deeds. A closer examination of Canada's relations with Central America 
and South Africa in the 1980s reveals a foreign policy that was influenced by self interested 
economic and trade matters. 
40 
Chapter2 
Canadian Foreign Policy: Words and Deeds 
Introduction 
In the 1980s, Canada's role in the international realm was expanding as it was 
playing more important parts in international organizations, international financial 
institutions, and the United Nations (UN). As the Cold War continued, Canada's middle 
power status and its multilateral activities provided it with a uniquely non-threatening 
position. Canada's economic and military capabilities were not significant enough to 
threaten other cmmtries, therefore, Canada's development assistance was often sought. 
Canada's foreign policy was often compared to those of the ' like-minded' states which 
incorporated humanitarian issues into their foreign and aid policies. An increased awareness 
ofhurnan rights and developmental assistance at the domestic and international level marked 
a change in Canadian foreign policy rhetoric during the 1980s. Canada's foreign policy 
toward Central America and South Africa provide examples of Ottawa's rhetoric. Ottawa 
attempted to promote the idea that through foreign and aid policies Ottawa would facilitate 
and support the changes necessary to bring about democratic change and respect for human 
rights. 
Two government reports, the Final Report: Canada's Relations with Latin America 
and the Caribbean and Competitiveness and Security: Declarations for Canada's 
International Relations, along with official government statements, provide reason to 
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believe that "peace, human rights and democracy were among the main fields of 
Conservative government interest."1 Canada's support for the Esquipulas II Accord and the 
Contadora Groups also provides examples of Canada becoming more involved in the 
domestic problems of the Central American countries. Ottawa believed that the crisis in 
Cental America was not part ofthe East-West conflict but a result of years of political and 
social repression, human rights violations, and economic failures. The government reports 
suggested that the solution was to increase aid and to facilitate democratic changes in the 
region through peaceful measures. Ottawa also believed that the crisis in South Africa was 
a result of years of oppression by the white minority government. The Mulroney government 
threatened economic sanctions on South Africa if its government did not change its domestic 
policies. 
Ottawa's foreign policies toward Central America and South Africa were often 
confusing and conflicting. A closer examination of Canadian foreign policy reveals that 
humanitarian and democratic concerns were not given a higher priority than trade and 
economic interests. Canada had economic interests in the Caribbean Basin and feared that 
these interests would be harmed if instability in Central America were not contained. 2 
Therefore, Ottawa wanted to stabilize the region to protect Canadian economic interests. 
'Gordon Mace and Claude Goulet. "Canada in the Americas: Assessing Ottawa's Behaviour," International 
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Ottawa was also careful not to directly criticize the US in order not to jeopardize relations 
with its largest trading partner.3 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's effort to influence domestic changes in South 
Africa was also more rhetoric than action. The economic sanctions that Mulroney threatened 
would have had little effect, as trade relations between the two countries were insignificant."' 
Also, the US and Britain did not support Canada' s position, therefore, it would have been 
difficult for Canada to implement effective economic sanctions on South Africa. 5 
The Canadian government's rhetoric was a reaction to public pressure. An increase 
in public awareness in Canada put pressure on the Canadian government to do more in tenns 
of bringing peace and stability to Central America and South Africa.6 Many people fleeing 
from violence and oppression in Central America sought refuge in Canada. 7 They made their 
homes in Canadian cities creating communities that were informed and involved in 
promoting peace, social justice, democratic development, human rights protection, and 
stability. Canadians wanted their government to become more involved, as Liisa North 
stated: "We are convinced that the Canadian government can and should do more to assist 
31bid., 113. 
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Central Americans to construct more just and peaceful societies. Through such assistance 
Canada would in tum contribute to the creation of a more equitable and peaceful 
international system. "8 
Mexico and the NAFT A provided the Canadian government with the opportunity to 
live up to its rhetoric. Mexico is a country with an authoritarian government, social 
injustices, human rights violations, and environmental degradation. Canada had the 
opportunity to put human rights and democracy ahead of its economic self interest when 
negotiating the free trade agreement. The agreement could have been conditional on the 
basis of democratic change in Mexico. However, Canada opted to put such issues aside. 
Ottawa argues that the free trade agreement is about trade and investments, and not 
about the domestic issues and problems of another country. When referring to Mexico, 
Ottawa argues that domestic issues are the domain of the sovereign state, therefore Canada 
has no business interfering. However, Canada has become involved in the domestic issues 
of other cmmtries in the past, and continues to do so in the present. It is difficult to consider 
economics without considering domestic policy, as one affects the other. 
~orth, Between War and Peace in Central America, 11. 
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Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1980s 
Ottawa's growing interest in human rights being an integral part of foreign policy was 
evident as '"Prime Minister Mulroney and his secretaries of state for external affairs have 
been outspoken about Canada's objectives on the issue of human rights in terms of what 
Canada wants, of what actions it will tolerate, of what it is prepared to do about violations, 
and of what it is prepared to do to promote them."9 However, despite Ottawa's rhetoric, 
Canada's human rights policy was shallow. It was careful not to jeopardize its trade and 
investment relations with other countries. With regard to Canadian aid, in situations where 
aid was cut off to a state in which human rights abuses were taking place, such as Surinam 
in 1983, and the Philippines in 1984, "in most such instances, however, lack of explicit 
condemnations of human rights abuses sent an ambiguous message to the states in 
question."10 Canadian aid, also continued to pour into states where human rights abuses took 
place, such as Indonesia, Chile, China, and El Salvador where economic interests were 
strong. Thus, Ottawa's actions did not live up to its rhetoric. 
The contradiction between Ottawa's statements about human rights issues and its 
actions could reflect Prime Minister's Mulroney's personal motivations as "personal 
diplomacy, at the prime ministerial level, took on a greater import during these years. While 
~athleen E. Mahoney. ·•Human Rights and Canada's Foreign Policy'\ International Journal XL VII ( 1992) 
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taking a hands-off approach on the day-to-day management of foreign policy, both Trudeau 
and Mulroney showed themselves willing to intrude forcefully on particular questions," 11 
such as Mulroney's South African policy. Mulroney's '"undue concern with status seeking'' 
created a foreign policy th6.t was inconsistent and full of contradictions.12 
Central America 
By the end of the 1970s a crisis was erupting in Central America. The repressive 
authoritarian and military regimes that ruled most of these countries created grave social, 
economic, and political conditions. The repressive regimes continuously violated human 
rights, and severe economic conditions created high levels of poverty and uneven 
development. 13 Popular unrest was emerging as living conditions were declining'. As a 
result, many revolutionary movements were beginning to emerge to overthrow their 
respective governments as ''modernization had produced a new generation of better educated 
opposition leaders" .15 
Prior to 1980, the Canadian government was hesitant to become involved in the 
human rights issues, as Kim Richard Nossal states: .. Canada's approach to human rights 
11 Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall 
Canada, 1997) 283. 
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violations in general has been predicated on a belief that it is both improper and inappropriate 
to weaken the principle of national sovereignty by interfering in the internal affairs of other 
countries."16 However, the situation in Central America was becoming one that Canada 
could not ignore. In 1982, the Department of External Affairs issued the Final Report: 
Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. The Report called for Canada 
to become more involved in the region by paying attention to social and economic matters. 
It stated that: ·•we believe that Canada should pursue the goal of stability through the foreign 
policy purposes we outlined in our first Report, namely, human rights, trade and investment, 
development assistance and security." 17 It also stressed that the government should pursue 
a more active policy on hwnan rights as: ••The obligation to defend and promote these rights 
springs from the moral principle that people have innate value and that certain rights repose 
in them as human beings ... Consequently, the discussion ofhuman rights violations in any 
country does not constitute an infringement of state sovereignty."18 
Canada's economic interests in Central America were not significant. However, it 
should not be assumed that because Canada had few economic interests in the region that the 
reason for its involvement was-purely humanitarian. There were some significant economic 
interests in the region that were of concern to Canada. James Rochlin suggests that because 
1~Kim Richard Nossal, .. Canadian Sanctions Against South Africa: Explaining the Mulroney lnitiatives, 
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approximately 40 percent of Canadian oil imports come from Central America, which border 
the region, Canada had an interest in maintaining stability in order to not disrupt its trade 
with these countries.'9 The 1985 foreign policy review, Competitiveness and Security: 
Directions for Canada 's International Relations, also pointed out that: ••Latin America was 
an increasingly important market for Canadian exports, that it was the second largest 
destination after the U.S. for Canadian investment capital, and that our banks had about 15 
billion in outstanding loans to the region."20 Although Canada placed an emphasis on hwnan 
rights, democracy, and developmental assistance, there were also economic interests in the 
region that Canada felt it had to protect. 
Canada objected to the increased militarization of the region as it was accomplishing 
nothing, but was always careful not directly to criticize the US. At the UN General 
Assembly in 1985, Canada stated: ··we view the upheaval in Central America as primarily 
a function of chronic social and economic injustice, coupled with .. . frustration over the 
failure to institute ... reforms to meet even the most basic popular expectations."21 Canada 
did not regard an increase in violence as the way to achieve peace. Canada voted ••in favour 
of the UN General Assembly resolution calling on the United States to comply with the June 
1986 ruling of the International Court of Justice, which demanded the cessation of aid to the 
·~ochlin. Discovering rhe Americas, 127. 
20Ibid .• 14 7. 
21North. Between War and Peace, 26. 
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contras. "21 In another House of Commons Report in 1988, the government indicated that the 
increased militarization has only added to destabilization within the region. 23 
Despite US- funded militarization of the region, Canada continued to pour aid in and 
pursue peace through other means. The government believed that if violence was stopped 
then negotiations could begin. For the 1981-86 period aid tripled to $100 million and then 
doubled again during 1988-95.24 In 1981, Canada cut offbilateral assistance to El Salvador 
and Guatemala because of increased human rights violations.25 However, aid was renewed 
to El Salvador in 1984, and to Guatemala in 1987. u; The government defended this decision 
by stating that: ·•marked improvement in the human rights situation and commitments by the 
democratically elected government to bring about substantial. .. reforms."27 However, 
evidence points to .. a continued pattern of gross human rights violations, military abuse and 
dominance, and a lack of capacity or willingness on the part of the recipient governments to 
pursue redistributive reforms or to open up the political process. "28 The controversy 
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surrounding Canada's decision to renew aid is part of the confusing, and sometimes 
contradictory, policy it pursued in Central America. 
Canada's aid policies have often been compared to the 'like-minded' states who 
shared similar views on the crisis in Central America. The like-minded group, consisting of 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, and Canada, generally considered the problem in Central America to be a 
political, social, and economic problem rather than part of the East/West conflict. Some 
members of the 'like-minded' group provided more assistance to the region than Canada did. 
Although Canada continued trading with Nicaragua at low levels, Spain, France, Denmark 
and Sweden ''were been more generous with export credits and financing to Nicaragua than 
has Canada."29 It was also argued that Sweden had more influence in the region than 
Canada, as it targeted its aid policies toward Nicaragua rather than throughout the entire 
region. 3° Canada appeared to have an active policy towards Central America, however the 
performance of other like-minded countries indicates that Canada's policies were somewhat 
restrained. 
Canada contributed to the peace process in Central America by opening up its refugee 
policy. Initially, Canada took in those fleeing from the turmoil in Central America. Between 
1982 and 1987 a total of20,935 refugees were admitted to Canada.31 The government also 
29Jonathan lemco, Canada and the Crisis in Central America, (New York: Praeger Pub.,l991) 58. 
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assisted the Central American work of the UN High Commission for Refugees and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.32 However, in 1988, the government changed its 
laws following changes in US immigration policies that would have caused a massive influx 
of refugees to Canada.33 Despite public criticisms, the government passed Bill C-55 which 
"allows for the automatic removal of any Central American refugee who has arrived in 
Canada via a supposedly "safe" third country;" and Bill C-84 which allowed for the detention 
of people who do not have proper documentation until their identities are established. 34 As 
Liisa North points out, "Many Central America refugees flee their countries without proper 
documentation, because it is too dangerous to obtain papers before leaving. "35 Changes in 
Canada's refugee policy indicates that although Canada was concerned about human rights 
in Central America, it was not prepared to fully dedicate itself to these principles. And 
although public pressure played an important part in shaping foreign policy, it was unable 
to influence the changes that the government made to its refugee policy. 
Canada's positive influence on the peace process in Central America is illustrated by 
its activities in the countries' elections and its participation in various regional organizations. 
Canada sent election observers to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Contadora 
Group, established in 1983, which consisted of Columbi~ Mexico, Panaro~ and Venezuela, 
1~orth, Between War and Peace. 51. 
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was supported by Canada. It is also interesting to note that the US was deliberately excluded 
as the "assumption was that each one of the countries was acting in its own national 
interest. "36 Canada offered assistance by participating in security verification planning and 
peacekeeping operations.37 Contadora "recognized that peace involved not only stopping the 
shooting wars but also moving towards national reconciliation. regional co-operation, arms 
control and disarmament, and a dramatic decrease in foreign military involvement. "38 
Canada also backed the Esquipulas II Agreemenf9 as stated in the 1988 House of Commons 
Report. The Agreement consisted of twenty-two specific commitments in five categories 
which included political, security, refugee, development and verification, and follow-up . ..o 
Esquipulas II was signed in 1987 by the five Central American countries and was a sign that 
these cmmtries would lead the peace process.-~• In 1989 Canada also participated in the UN 
Observer Groups in Central America to monitor compliance of the accord's security 
clauses."'2 
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Canadian foreign policy in Central America was confusing and often contradictory 
due to both domestic pressures and external constraints. Public awareness of the crisis in 
Central America was significant given the high numbers of refugees in Canada, and the 
interest groups, church organizations, and NGOs working in the region. By 1987 there were 
sixty-two vohmtary organizations working in the region:0 A Gallup poll, conducted in the 
summer of 1984, indicated that Canadians opposed US policy in the region by a two-to-one 
margin"" and that over two-thirds of Canadians believed that Canada should have an 
independent foreign policy from the US.~5 Canadians wanted an overall foreign policy that 
backed an·· .. activist foreign policy"; a rejection of .. Cold War diagnoses" and of increased 
defence spending; ·•maximum support for working with international organizations"; and 
growing belief in the appropriateness of considering human rights records when formulating 
foreign policy.""'6 Domestic groups were important sources of criticism as they provided 
infonnation, suggestions, and competing perspectives. They tried to pressure the government 
to take a more radical position in terms of promoting peace, however, the government was 
constrained by other considerations. 
Canada's foreign policy in Central America was also constrained by the US. The US 
believed that the Cental American crisis was a legitimate American security concern, and that 
~3Canada. .. Supporting the Five", 25. 
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Canada should recognize this. This external constraint can be used to explain why Canada's 
policies were sometimes confusing. Direct opposition to US policy in Central America by 
the Canadian government would have caused friction. Canada was not prepared to disrupt 
its relationship with its largest trading partner. Although the 1988 Report denounced US 
actions in Central America, Canada, limited its public criticism of Washington's policies. 
The Mulroney government was, at that moment, pursuing a free trade agreement with the 
US, and presumably feared that friction with the US might have have jeopardized the 
negotiations. Although we can see an increase in importance of human rights and 
development assistance during the 1980s, it was not given as much priority as it could have 
been given due to trade and economic constraints. 
Domestic sources pressured the government to pursue a policy that was independent 
from the US, however, at the same time Ottawa's options were constrained by the US. 
James Rochlin stated that: ·~hen officials met to concoct policy on Central America, they 
consulted two groups of experts - one group which specialized in Canada's bilateral relations 
with Central American states, and another group whose expertise was U.S. strategic interests 
in the Western Hemisphere.""' The Canadian government did manage to pursue policies that 
were different from the US, when Canada continued trading with the Sandinistas after 
~7Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 113. (Interview, David Bickford. Dept. of External Affairs, Caribbean 
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Reagan's trade embargo in 1985 against Nicaragua.48 However, Canadian foreign policy 
continued on a path that did not jeopardize its economic and trade relations with the US. 
South Africa 
The Mulroney government responded to the apartheid policies of the white minority 
South African government by implementing partial economic sanctions. It was a reaction 
to the increase in violence and riots as the black majority pressed for an end to the minority 
white rule. The Mulroney government's foreign policy toward South Africa suggests that 
human rights and democracy issues were becoming an integral part of Canadian foreign 
policy. ln 1985 at the UN General Assembly meeting Mulroney threatened to impose total 
sanctions if the South African government did not change: ''Canada is ready, if there are no 
fundamental changes in South Africa, to invoke total sanctions against that country and its 
repressive regime. More than that, if there is no progress in the dismantling of apartheid, 
relations with South Africa may have to be severed absolutely.'""9 
Despite the Canadian government's rhetoric, trade sanctions had little effect and total 
sanctions were never implemented. Trade between the two countries was never substantial. 
Trade with South Africa had been approximately 0.5 percent of Canadian total imports and 
" Ibid.. 6. 
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less of exports, and direct investment has been approximately 0.1 percent since the 1960s.50 
·'During the sanctions period from October 1986 to September 1993, Canada's real two-way 
trade with South Africa remained substantial: amounting to $1.6 billion. or 44 percent of the 
comparable period before sanctions ( 1979-85), and this in a period of stagnant or negative 
growth in South Africa."51 The trade sanctions had little effect as "most of the fmancial 
sanctions were voluntary, and Commonwealth commitments were twisted to allow Canadian 
speciality steel manufacturers to import ferro-alloys from South Africa. [And] Sulphur, the 
most important Canadian export, indeed the only Canadian export with a potential to affect 
South Africa negatively, was exempt from sanctions entirely."52 
The Mulroney's government's actions failed to live up to its rhetoric. Mulroney 
became too involved with domestic issues such as the 1988 federal elections and the free 
trade agreement with the US.53 The economic sanctions were limited in nature and had little 
effect, however they had symbolic significance as it was the first time, ""the government had 
prohibited trade in private goods with the Republic. It marked the most significant change 
in Canada's South African policy in years."54 It is also apparent that Canada attempted to 
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pursue a policy that was independent. Britain refused to support economic sanctions on 
South Africa as Margaret Thatcher had no intentions of breaking economic ties. 55 The US 
government also did not want to break economic ties, as Dr. Chester Croker, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated: that the US .. had no intentions of destabilizing 
South Africa in order to curry favour elsewhere. Neither will we align ourselves with 
apartheid policies that are abhorrent to our own multiracial democracy."56 Despite the 
Mulroney government's attempts to influence domestic policy in South Africa, it quickly 
abandoned this project. 
Mexico and NAFTA 
The globalization of production, the increasing presence of transnational 
corporations, the move towards regional trade blocks in the world economy, and the 
increasing threat of US protectionism, motivated the Mulroney government to further 
economic integration by entering into a free trade agreement with the US and Mexico. 
Canadian foreign policy rhetoric also began to change as '"the prospect of a bilateral free 
trade agreement between the United States and Mexico, have led the Canadian government 
to more clearly express its viewpoint regarding North American economic integration and 
H James Barber, The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa. (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1983) 86. 
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the development of relations with Mexico."57 During the negotiations for the NAFTA it was 
clear foreign policy was guided by economic self-interest. 
The decline in public pressure after the end of the crisis in Central America and at the 
beginning of the NAFTA negotiations also affected the Canadian government's human 
rights policy as the government no longer had to respond to the pressure. This change could 
have been a result of "a shift in Canadian values away from liberal internationalism and 
towards narrow preoccupation with immediate national self-interest."58 National economic 
self-interest has preoccupied Canadians as they realized the potential benefits to an increase 
in international trade. 59 Also, a change in public support for a social safety net ·•is clearly no 
longer as Wliversal as it once was, nor is it identified as frequently as a valued and distinctive 
feature of Canadian society. As Canadian society becomes less caring towards its own poor, 
it is likely that it is also becoming less concerned about those beyond its borders."60 Another 
element to the decline of public pressure could be linked to the "erosion of Canada's sense 
of national identity and the apparent inability of Canadians to resolve their constitutional 
'
7Mace and Goulet, "Canada in the Americas: Assessing Ottawa's Behaviour'', 147. 
51Cranford Pran, ed., ·•Hwnan Internationalism and Canadian Deveiopment Assistance Policies", Canadian 
International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994) 
337. 
59Ibid., 337-
60 Ibid., 336. 
58 
crisis may well lessen the nation's capacity and inclination to play a prominent role as liberal, 
internationalist middle power. •.tS 1 
Many opponents ofNAFf A criticized the lack of democracy and respect for human 
rights in Mexico. Ottawa showed little concern for these issues as its only interest was not 
being left out of negotiations on further regional economic integration.62 This shift in policy 
has been carried through into the 1990s with Canada's push for further economic integration 
and the bilateral free trade agreement with Chile. 
Initially, Mexico approached the US and proposed a bi-lateral free trade agreement 
between the two countries. Mexico believed that it needed to secure its position within the 
world economy as Europe was no longer a viable option.63 It also felt economically 
threatened by being excluded from CUSFTA.64 A bilateral free trade agreement between 
Mexico and the US would have given American businesses a greater advantage because they 
would have taken advantage of all three markets, while Canada and Mexico would only have 
had access to two. As a result, the Canadian government decided to become part of the 
negotiations since it did not want a 'hub and spoke' arrangement in the Americas. As Edgar 
Dosman states: ''Productive investments and trade are thus controlled by the ''hub," because 
~I Ibid., 336. 
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it offers the widest trade opportunities. •'!6S Neither Canada nor Mexico wanted US businesses 
to yield that much power. 
Canada's position on Mexico wanting to be part of the free trade agreement was 
therefore reactive and defensive rather than active. Canada has never had close ties with 
Mexico, however both do share the US as a neighbour. Canadian-Mexican trade has not been 
significant ... Canada's exports to Mexico represent less than 1 percent of Canada's total 
export market during the late 1980s and early 1990s. and their level actually declined from 
$63 8 million in 1 989, to $608 million in 1990, and to $460 million in 1991 ... and Canadian 
direct investment in Mexico decreased from $207 million in 1986 to $175 million in 1990."66 
Both Canada and Mexico were in a vulnerable position as the majority of their trade is with 
the US and with the increase of regional trading blocks that tend to be exclusionary they 
needed to secure access to US markets. Both countries had an interest in establishing a rules-
based trading system with the US as it would create a more stable trading system and would 
have protected both economies from the agressive trading policies for which the US is 
known. 
Canada's sudden interest in Mexico as part of the NAFf A illustrates a change in 
rhetoric as it focused on the importance of trade and investment. Canada's interest in 
Mexico was based on Ottawa's concerns about the US becoming the 'hub'. Little attention 
was given to Mexico's questionable democratic credentials. Ottawa argued that addressing 
•'Ibid.. 5. 
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such an issue between trading partners is difficult because domestic policy has traditionally 
not been part of trade policy. However. Canada's rhetoric towards South Africa in the 1980s 
illustrates that it was willing to put human rights above trade as it threatened to impose 
economic sanctions against the country unless it changed its domestic policy on apartheid. 
Ottawa's lack of interest in democracy and human rights was clearly demonstrated 
during the negotiations of the NAFr A, as many opponents argued that greater emphasis 
should be placed on these issues. The majority of opposition to the NAFT A came from the 
pro-democracy movement in Mexico; those in the US who thought that it was the US 
government's responsibility to promote democracy and human rights; and the US labour 
organization, the American Federation ofLabor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO). It was only after the AFL-CIO started criticizing the agreement that Canadian labour 
organizations and leftist organizations became involved. Within Mexico, opposition to the 
NAFT A came from those sectors of society that felt that the free trade agreement would 
benefit the ruling oligarchy and big business, which would lead to the .. strengthening of an 
·•authoritarian democracy," uninterested in the environment and workers' rights.'!67 
Opponents to NAFT A wanted the negotiations to be conditioned on the complete 
democratization of the political system.68 They feared that economic liberalization would 
not translate into political liberalization. 
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Within the US, some critics argued that it was America's responsibility to promote 
democracy and respect for human rights and that the free trade agreement should have been 
based on those criteria. U.S. Senator Ernest Hollings argued that democracy should be put 
first '"and rewards democratic progress with economic and trade privileges .. . •.ti'l Although 
the ALF-CIO was concerned about the effects ofNAFTA on US jobs, it also claimed that 
the treaty would force them to work at substandard wages; that it would .. tum all of Mexico 
into a giant maquiladora that would contribute little to industrialization, technological 
growth, or international competitiveness"; and that Mexican workers have few rights and a 
•'limited social safety net on which to fall back."70 Opponents to NAFTA wanted 
democratization to occur before economic liberalization. 
The shift in Canadian foreign and trade policy can be attributed to the changes in the 
global system. These changes left the Canadian economy in a wlnerable position due to 
Canada's dependency on trade and US markets. As Edgar Dosman states: ·• International 
trade policy is a game of very high stakes for Canada. Not only is the country much more 
trade-dependent than the US (27 percent versus 11 percent of GOP), but a 70.37 percent 
concentration of trade with the US increases its vulnerability still further."71 
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Conclusion 
Investigating Canadian foreign policy in the 1980s reveals a disjunction between 
Ottawa's human rights rhetoric and its actions. Ottawa's actions illustrate that Canadian 
foreign policy was guided by the principles of self interest in order to protect economic and 
trade interests. The fuel behind the Canadian government's rhetoric in the 1980s was 
societal pressure and Prime Minister Mulroney's personal attempts to address international 
issues that were of personal interest to him. The result was a confusing and often 
contradictory foreign policy. 
The presence of communities in Canadian cities of refugees from Central America; 
the activities of Canadian non-governmental organizations in South Africa and Central 
America; and media coverage of outbreaks of violence in both regions, provoked the 
Canadian goverrunent to react to the public's demands. The result was an increase in 
rhetoric and official government statements claiming that human rights and democratic issues 
would be given a higher priority than economic and trade interests. Although Canada did 
attempt to contribute to the promotion of peace and stability (especially in Central America), 
Ottawa would only go so far. 
Ottawa's limited pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights promotion was 
also evident in policies toward China. Ottawa imposed economic sanctions on China after 
the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. As T.A. Keenlyside points out: "In reality, 
however, the aid sanctions imposed on China, like the other initiatives taken at the same 
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time, were symbolic rather than substantive.'m The economic sanctions were not substantial 
enough to have any affect on China. 73 And, as in policies toward South Africa and Central 
America, Ottawa's rhetoric was influenced by "intense media focus on China, lobbying by 
concerned groups, parliamentary preoccupation with the situation, ministerial attention to 
China, and actions by other states. "74 In the end, China was Canada's second largest aid 
recipient for 1990-91 and in 1992 was Canada's fifth largest export market. 75 Canada 
therefore is continuing relations with a country that is authoritarian and repressive. 
In the 1990s Canada has pursued the promotion of democratic development, human 
rights, good governance, and environmental protection through its activities in various 
organizations in Latin America, such as the OAS which it officially joined in 1990. Within 
the OAS, "Canada launched an activist programme, working within various committees such 
as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission, the Inter-American Conunission of Women, and helping to monitor 
elections in Nicaragua, Haiti, and elsewhere."76 Canada was also one of the main supporters 
for a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy which was "envisioned broadly to promote and 
reinforce democratic institutions in the hemisphere, to help in the monitoring of elections and 
72Keenlyside, ·•Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity", 257. 
nlbid., 257. 
~~Ibid.. 258. 
"rbid., 257. 
16David Mackenzie ... Canada in the Organization of American States: The First Five Years!' Behind the 
Headlines. (Ottawa: Canadian Institute oflntemational Affairs, 1994) 5. 
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to give practical training to men and women at both the grass-roots and official levels.'m 
However, .. while willing to restate the government's commitment to human rights and the 
prevention of drug abuse, relatively little progress had been made beyond the committee 
stage."78 This reveals that such pursuits take place with the boundaries of self-interest as 
Canada's interest in Latin America is a response to necessity as" these initiatives still hark 
back to the political emphasis of the 1980s, they [also] display the dominant character of 
Canada's Latin American policy in the 1990s: the lack of control the government seems to 
have over its own growing agenda in the region.''79 
Trade and investtnent interests in Latin America are given high priority in Canadian 
foreign policy due to Ottawa's desire to expand economic integration in the Americas. As 
the global economy moves toward the formation of exclusionary trade blocs Canada seeks 
to secure markets and trade relations. Political and economic changes in Latin America have 
facilitated an increase in trade relations and provided opportunities for foreign investment. 
In advancing its economic agenda, Ottawa has minimized the importance of democratic 
development and protection for human rights. It is necessary to address democratic 
development, good governance, respect for the rule of law, protection of human rights, and 
environmental protection as they are all necessary elements for future development and 
17Ibid .• 5. 
71Ibid., 5. 
79Jean Daudelin. '"The Politics of Oligarchy: 'Democracy' and Canada's Recent Conversion to Latin 
America." Canada Among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy. ed. Maxwell Cameron and Maureen 
Molot. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995) 149-151. 
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prosperity. It is in Canada's best long term interests to support development in all areas in 
order to maximize future prosperity and growth. 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 
Chile 
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This chapter takes a brief look at Chilean history, the military coup, Pinochet's 
economic recovery policies, the 1989 plebiscite, and Chile's transition to democracy. 
Authoritarian hold-overs from the Pinochet government still remain. For Chile to fully 
consolidate democracy it is essential to remove these vestiges of dictatorship. This chapter 
further suggests why it is important for Canada to consider the issues surrounding Chile ' s 
democratization. 
Between 1932 and 1973 Chile was a restricted democracy in that it was dominated 
by the upper class. Political parties were highly divided ideologically between the right, 
centre and left, thus creating opposing social movements. As long as its interests were not 
threatened, the upper class tolerated opposition from the left. This tolerance began to wane 
during Eduardo Frei's 1964-1970 administration as he attempted to complete formal 
democratization (i.e. universal suffrage) which jeopardized the interests of the business and 
corporate sector. The right's patience ended during Salvador Allende's 19 70-1 973 
administration as he sought a peaceful transition to socialism. As a result, a military coup 
took place in 1973. 
Historically, Canada's trade and political relations with Chile were insignificant and 
therefore Ottawa did not become involved with Chile's domestic politics. Although Canada 
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accepted a number of refugees during the Pinochet era, it did not seek to change the 
dictatorship's policies, thus acting quite differently from the "like-minded states" (for 
example, Sweden) that tried to bring pressure on Pinochet. During the mid-l980s the 
Chilean economy began to improve dramatically and Canadian trade with Chile slowly 
increased. Domestic opposition to the military regime began to emerge during this period 
as Pinochet's economic policies had a negative effect on society. [n 1988 a plebiscite voted 
not to extend Pinochet's mandate and Chile's return to democracy was underway. 
Despite an increase in trade and economic relations with Chile, Canada still remains 
aloof from Chile's domestic affairs. Authoritarian hold-overs from the Pinochet regime are 
still in place, affecting the civilian government's ability to implement the necessary reforms 
for democratic development. The Canadian government's policy suggests that Ottawa does 
not want to address political or social issues in Chile, because it does not want to antagonize 
business and corporate interests. 
History 
Prior to the Frei administration in 1964, Chile had a relatively stable democratic 
system with a growing ideological division between the right, centre, and left. However, 
democratic stability was dependent on the hacienda system. Large estates, or 'haciendas', 
controlled most of the agricultural output and the wealthy owners expected the government 
to protect their interests. For the landowners to maintain their dominance over the rural 
workers, the hacienda system had to be maintained 'through the prevention of rural 
257. 
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unionization and the exclusion of outside political influences."' In fact, rural unionization 
was illegal and any labour conflicts were met with repression that was justified in terms of 
ensuring democratic stability. Chile's elites tolerated opposition as long as it did not threaten 
their interests. As a result, the left and the working class became increasingly frustrated and 
the party system became highly polarized ideologically. 
A threat to the maintenance of the hacienda system came in 195 8 when the electoral 
system was reformed. An Australian ballot was introduced which was a single official ballot 
and penalties would be incurred for fraud and bribery. Previously, landowners would control 
votes by distributing party ballots and monitoring workers to ensure they voted 'correctly' .2 
After the electoral reforms, rural workers were free to vote how they wanted. This threatened 
the upper class, as it meant that the parties on the right would lose power and those on the 
centre and left would gain congressional seats. In fact, precisely this happened in the 1961 
congressional elections when the right won less than one-third of the seats in Congress for 
the first time in the twentieth century. 3 
The election of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei (the father of current president 
Eduardo Frei) in 1964 was a turning point for the stability of Chilean democracy. Frei, who 
attempted to complete Chile's democracy through agrarian reform and rural unionization, 
'Brian Loveman. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
zlbid., 293. 
1Ibid.. 297. 
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gained support of rural workers, as well as the US, who pressured the Chilean government 
for land reforms. Land would be redistributed to create 100,000 new proprietors among the 
landless peasants.4 However, only 30,000 were created because the government faced 
difficulties in its implementation. 5 The Frei government believed that in order to increase 
agricultural production, the workers had to be involved in the political process.6 Mobilization 
and unionization of rural workers resulted in an increase in the nwnber of workers belonging 
to unions. In 1964, 2,000 agricultural workers belonged to wtions, and by 1970 there were 
114,000 which accowtted for more than 30 percent of agricultural workers.7 The 
mobilization of rural workers angered the right, because it threatened their political and 
economic power. 
The Frei government greatly altered Chilean politics as labour, the poor, and other 
members of the left's constituency were given access to the political system which increased 
their political influence. The right and the upper class no longer controlled government 
which had traditionally favoured their interests. Besides angering the right, this new 
situation also created problems for the Frei govenunent as: "during its last three years of the 
Frei government, the number of strikes increased from 1,100 in 1968 to 1,800 in 1970, while 
~Julio Faundex. Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende. (London: Yale 
University Press, 1988) 143. 
'Ibid., 143. 
6Ibid, 143. 
1Ibid., 144. 
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the number of workers involved in strike activity increase from 300,000 to 656,000."8 The 
result was a dramatic change in Chilean politics, 
The reformist legislation of the Frei years and the massive organizational drive 
encouraged by the Christian Democratic administration provided substantial leverage 
for further fundamental reforms in Chilean society. In this sense the Christian 
Democrats definitively destroyed the cornerstone of Chilean formal democracy as it 
had functioned since 1932, without providing anything but the vaguely conceived 
notion of a .. communitarian" society to replace it.9 
The Chilean political system had been seriously divided ideologically; however, the policies 
of the Frei government created a wider gap between the left and the right. This is 
exemplified in the next election results as the left's (Unidad Popular) candidate, Salvador 
Allende, won based on his campaign for a peaceful transition to socialism. 
Historically, Canada's relations with Chile were limited. Indeed, Chile once even 
asked the US to pressure Canada to extend it diplomatic recognition in view of Canada's 
recognition of Argentina and Brazil. 10 It was not until 1941 that Ottawa established 
diplomatic relations with Chile. 11 Also, Canada-Chile trade was insignificant despite the 
efforts of two trade missions in 1941 and 1968.12 
'Ibid, 152. 
'1.oveman. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 325. 
10Janice Paskey and Roberto Duran Sepulveda, Unlikely Allies: Canada-Chile Relations in the 1990s. 
(Ottawa: FOCAL, 1996.) 8. 
111bid., 8. 
71 
The election of Salvador Allende in 1970 brought dramatic change to Chilean 
politics, because it indirectly led to the end of Chilean democracy. Allende believed that 
through radical, though peaceful, legal and democratic reforms Chile could be transformed 
into a socialist state with an equitable distribution of wealth and resources. ·'As a Marxist 
Allende believed that the proletariat would continue to be exploited as long as it was denied 
control over the means of production." 13 Allende proposed a 'peaceful transition to 
socialism' which included reforms to political institutions; reorganization of the judiciary 
and the educational system; and expanding the public sector of the economy by expropriating 
agricultural estates and nationalizing the financial system. 14 Allende also nationalized some 
of the largest copper mines but "'denied compensation because, according to Popular Unity 
officials, they were guilty of extracting excess profits and therefore had already taken their 
compensation." 1 s 
Allende's reforms were met with opposition domestically and internationally. 
Domestically, the right and the upper class were threatened. They were outraged by the 
expropriation of agricultural lands and the expropriation of key businesses in order to create 
an expanded public sector. The dissatisfaction of the upper class created economic problems 
as ••domestic investment declined by 5 percent as private firms responded negatively to the 
13Gary W. Wynia. The Politics of Latin American Development, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984) 182. 
1
"Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 329. 
"Wynia. The Politics of Latin American Development, 182. 
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threat of expropriation."16 The floundering economy also created opposition from the poor 
as poverty levels were climbing: "By mid-1973 the annual rate of inflation exceeded 300 
percent and reduced the real income of workers and salaried employees to levels below those 
of late 1970 when the UP had taken office." 17 An increase in strikes, protests, and civil 
unrest in 1973 ''elicited a call by the majority opposition in the Chilean Congress for the 
military to intervene to guarantee institutional stability." 18 
Allende's peaceful transition to socialism was also met with opposition from 
Washington and its allies. Allende's ties with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba 
created fears that the Soviet Union was penetrating the US sphere of influence in the 
Americas. The US, therefore, by means ''both covert and diplomatic, sought to disrupt the 
Chilean economy, to cut off or stifle credit from international lending agencies, to provide 
financial and moral support for the regime's opponents- and to maintain friendly relations 
with the Chilean military."19 Also, multinational companies with investments in Chile were 
hit as Allende nationalized key industries. Canadian economic interests in Chile included: 
CP Air, Bata, Noranda, Atlas Explorations, and Hinclrichs Mining.20 One of Bata's 
companies was thought to be occupied by 'left-wing extremists' by the Department of 
10Ibid., l84. 
17Loveman. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 336. 
11Ibid., 345. 
"Ibid., 334. 
2oaochlin. Discovering the Americas, 86. 
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External Affairs.21 This concerned Canadian investors who feared their companies would 
be expropriated. As a result of the growing economic and political chaos in Chile, the Export 
Development Corporation refused to finance Canadian exports to the country. 22 
Despite the Canadian government's positive relatioms with Cuba and other 
democratic and non-democratic socialist governments, Ottawa was not prepared to support 
Allende. First, Ottawa did not believe that a crisis was going to erupt in Chile. In fact, just 
five days before the coup, a telex from the Canadian Ambassador in Chile, Andrew Ross, 
declared that the violence was a continuing crisis, but manageable.23 Secondly, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, Minister Mitchell Sharp believed that Allende was incompetent 
and ''the cause of his own problems. We did not have anything against him, but this is what 
we felt at the time, right or wrong. "24 
The lack of support both internationally and domestically, the floundering economy, 
and the growing social unrest, created the conditions for a military coup which ended 
constitutional democracy in Chile. The military coup began on September 11, 1973 with an 
attack on the presidential palace. Within a few days the junta dissolved Congress, suspended 
the constitution, declared political parties illegal, and proclaimed 'a state of internal war' in 
the country. Although the opposition called on the military to intervene in order to maintain 
21 Ibid., 86. 
22Ibicl, 86. 
23Stevenson. Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, 208. 
!"Ibid., 211. 
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stability, ''most Chileans did not really believe that a military putsch would occur."25 
Widespread repression, torture, disappearances, and murder became common in Chile. 
Pinochet defended the coup and "the government's repressive measures by alleging that the 
Allende coalition had a plot (plan zeta) to murder military and civilian opposition leaders in 
order to impose communism definitively upon Chile."26 The military government believed 
that Chile had been saved from communism and set out to transform the state. 
The military coup in Chile received mixed reactions from other countries. The US 
immediately recognized the junta, as the US had covertly supported the military's efforts. 
Sweden believed that the Allende govenunent was "an equity-oriented and popular regime, 
whereas the military regime that followed was not considered legitimate or desirable. "27 The 
Canadian government withheld recognition of the military junta for two weeks, but finally 
granted recognition for a number of reasons. The Trudeau government had recently 
recognized the People's Republic of China; it argued that ''it was established policy 
especially in light of the Chinese case, to recognize governments which were in control of 
the territory without implying an acceptance or approval of the type of regime"; other 
!jLoveman. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capiralism, 349. 
261bid., 350. 
27Susan Holmberg, .. Welfare Abroad: Swedish Development Assistance." The Committed Neutral: 
Sweden's Foreign Policy. ed. Bengt Sundelius. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) 123. 
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military governments in Latin America were recognized by Ottawa; and there was a lack of 
sympathy for the Allende government in Ottawa. 28 
High levels of repression forced many Chileans to flee the country. Intense lobbying 
by domestic groups pressured the Canadian government to accept these refugees. Pressure 
came from Canadian interest groups, '"including the Inter-Church Committee for Human 
Rights, the Canadian Labour Congress, the Chile-Canada Solidary Committee, the Canadian 
Association of University Teachers, and the Association of Colleges and Universities of 
Canada."29 Church organizations across Canada established the lnter-Church Ad-Hoc 
Committee on Chile in September and October of 1973, which was renamed the Inter-
Church Conunittee on Human Rights in Latin America.30 The churches sent fact-fmding 
missions to Chile that reported gross human rights violations. Eventually these reports 
convinced the government to accept more refugees. 31 
Initially, the Canadian government was slow to react to requests by Chileans for 
asylum. The Canadian embassy in Santiago accepted only seventeen refugees immediately 
after the coup because of the Canadian ambassador's hostility toward the Chilean left, who 
he called the "riffraff'' of Latin America.32 However, with increasing domestic pressure, the 
21Stevenson. Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, 212. 
2
'R.ochlin. Discovering the Americas, 103. 
30Stevenson, Canadian Foreign Policy Toward Latin America, 315, 327. 
ll Ibid., 316. 
32Rochlin. Discovering the Americas, 103. 
76 
government accepted a total of 7,000 refugees by 1978. As a result, Canada became the 
largest provider of asylum for Chilean refugees in the world. 33 Despite this, Ottawa 
developed a hands-off policy toward Chile between 1973 and 1988. 
Pinochet 's Economic Reforms 
The Pinochet government believed Chile's economic decline in previous years was 
a result of state intervention in the economy and Allende's socialist policies. As a result, 
Pinochet set out to transform Chile into a capitalist, neo-liberal economy. A group of 
economists known as the 'Chicago Boys' (because of their education at the University of 
Chicago) were employed by the government. They believed that: "opening the economy to 
the rest of the world would result in a reallocation of resources toward those sectors in which 
Chile had a comparative advantage, increased efficiency, rising exports, higher employment 
over the longer run, faster growth and an improved income distribution."34 Two phases of 
the economic transformation took place, each with a major recession. The first phase entailed 
a complete structural transformation with emphasis on an open economy, reduced state 
intervention, and liberalization of trade. Reforms during this period included: 
a commercial opening through the wholesale reduction ofhigh tariff barriers. Second, 
state controls, especially in strategic markets (such as the financial market) were 
33Ibid., 109. 
3~Sebastian Edwards and Alejandra Cox Edwards. Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean 
Experiment. (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987) 110. 
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dismantled. Thir~ the first wave of privatization, which affected profitable public 
companies, got under way. 35 
The first phase of transformation in the economy resulted in a recession in 1974-75 and 
another in 1981-82. Tariff cuts caused imports to rise, exports to fall and unemployment to 
After the 1982 recession, the second phase of the economic transformation took 
place, which put greater emphasis on an export-based economy. During this recovery there 
was further privatization and an important shift in policy that "involved the decision to 
impose tight state regulation on ·strategic markets• (interest rates, exchange rates, minimum 
wages, agricultural prices, and public tariffs) in order to stimulate a structural modification 
of relative prices that would favour an export economy."37 Table 3.1 demonstrates the 
success of the economy as the gross domestic product and the gross national product 
recovered quickly after the 1982 recession. 
H Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz. Chile: The Great Transformation. (Washington: The Brookings 
lnstitute, 1996) 48. 
16Ibid., 48. 
17Ibid., 48. 
Table 3.1 
Annual Rate of GDP and GNP in Chile38 
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Table 3.2looks at trade figures for selected years. Exports and imports grew in the 
late 1970s, but dropped slightly during the 1981-82 recession. During the second phase of 
economic reforms, exports and imports began to increase, reaching$ US 8.1 and 7.1 billion, 
respectively at the end of the Pinochet regime in 1989. Exports, as a percent ofGDP, rose 
from 20.4 in 1974 to 32.0 in 1989. 
38United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995-1996. (Chile: United 
Nations, 1996) 162. 
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Table 3.2 
Integration into the World Economy39 
Integration into the World Economy, Selected Years, 1974-1995 
Indicator I 1974 I 1977 I 1980 I 1983 I 1986 I 1989 I 1992 I 1995 
Exports (billions of U.S. dollars) 2.2 2.2 4.7 3.8 4.2 8.1 10.0 16.0 
Imports (billions of U.S. dollars) 2.4 2.2 5.5 3.2 3.4 7.1 12.0 16.0 
Exports as percent of GDP 20.4 20.6 22.8 24.0 30.6 32.0 35.9 37.3 
Number of exporters 200 250 800 500 1,800 3,465 5,416 6,000 
Exports and imports as percent of GDP 43.3 40.9 49.3 43.9 55.1 60.3 78.8 74.7 
Average nominal tariff (percent) 75.0 22.0 10.0 18.0 20.0 15.0 I 1.0 11.0 
Index of nominal tariffs (1974== 100) 100.0 29.3 13.3 24.0 26.7 20.0 14.7 14.7 
Real exchange rate (1974""100) 100.0 92.4 87.6 103.7 147.4 157.0 141 .0 128.6 
Foreign debt (billions of U.S. dollars) 4.0 5.3 10.9 17.2 20.0 16.3 18.2 21.2 
Foreign debt ratio to exports 1.9 2.4 2.3 4.5 4.8 2.0 1.8 1.3 
Source: Central Bank of Chile 
39Martinez and Diaz, Chile: The Greal Transformalion, 52. 
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The government's economic reforms caused great hardships on society as they 
required that social expenditures be cut. As a result, poverty and unemployment rose, and 
real wages fell. And there was no 'safety net' for those who fell into poverty. In 1976 
poverty levels in the Greater Santiago area rose to 57 percent but by 1985 had fallen to 46 
percent.40 Unemployment hurt the poorest as ''more than half of the Wlemployed belonged 
to the lowest income quintile, and nearly four-fifths of the unemployed belonged to families 
with below average income. Also, tmemployment hurt lower-income groups more severely 
because they had fewer income earners per family.'"' 1 The government's social policy 
ignored growing levels of unemployment and poverty since ''between 1970 and 1988 total 
social expenditures per capita fell by 8.8%, and health alone by almost 30%.'"'2 
Table 3.3 clearly demonstrates the declining levels of income and an increase in 
poverty during the Pinochet regime. The Gini coefficient measures the dispersion between 
the distribution of income and "is considered to be relatively even, if its value falls between 
0.2 and 0.35.'"'3 Chile's Gini coefficient increased from 0.493 in 1969-71 to 0.543 in 1982-
84, (Table 3.3). The lowest 40% and the middle 40% of the income bracket experienced a 
4
°Cristian Moran, ··Economic Stabilization and Structural Transfonnation: Lessons from the Chilean 
Experience, 1973-87 ," World Development 17, no.4 ( 1989) 495. 
41 Partricio MeUer, .. Adjustment and Social Costs in Chile During the 1980s," World Development 19, 
no.11 (1991) 1556. 
42Alan Angell, ·•The Transition to Democracy in Chile: A Model or an Exceptional Case?" Parliamentary 
A./fairs 46, no.4 ( 1993) 565. 
43 Author unknown. "Dynamics of the Gini coefficient"; accessed Feb. 20, 1998 
[http://www.ciesin.ee/UNDP/nhdr/Figure8l.htmlJ 
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decline in the share of income between 1970 and 1984, while the highest 20% of the income 
bracket experienced an increase. The Sen indicator demonstrates that more people were 
living in poverty by the 1980s, while real wages declined by 10 percent and the 
unemployment rate steadily increased. 
Table 3.3 
Indicators of Income Distribution""' 
INDICATORS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SANTIAGO AND CHILE 
Gini coefficient Share of Income Sen Real ~nemployment 
Indicator( a) Wage RR(l'/o) 
Period of family income lowest middle Highest Indicator 
40% 40% 20% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1969-71 0.493 ll.S(b) 32.7(b) 55.8(b) 19.0 100.0 5.5 
1980-81 0.523 11.1 31.4 57.6 17.6 89.6 16.5 
1982-84 0.543 10.0 (c) 30.6( c) 59.5 28.3 90.5 27.4 
(a) The Sen indicator measures the intensity of poveny in the "extreme poverty" sector. It combines the 
percentage of families below ""poverty line" and the gap between their actual income and the .. poverty line" 
income. Higher values of the Sen Indicator denotes a higher intensity of poveny. 
(b)1970 
(c)1982-1983 
Sources: Columns 1-4: Heskia ( 1979) and Riveros ( 1984 ). Figures are for Santiago 
Colunm 5: Torche ( 1987). Figures are for Chile 
Column 6: Cortazar and Meller ( 1987). Figures are for Chile 
Column 7: Jadresic ( 1986). Includes special public programs (PEM and POJH). Figures are for Chile 
Opening the Chilean economy by liberalizing trade and investment created favourable 
conditions for foreign investors. Although various interest groups in Canada pressured 
""'Partricio Meller, Adjustment and Equity in Chile. (France: Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1992) 21 . 
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Ottawa to stop trading with Pinochet's Chile, they were unsuccessful. ''At the U.N., Canada 
had spoken and voted against human rights violations in Chile, but Ottawa maintained that 
economic sanctions against that country would only hurt Canadian interests and would have 
little effect in altering Chilean policies.'"'5 The government also accepted Pinochet's 
economic policies, arguing "the Department of External Affairs argued that the military 
junta's austerity plan offered 'reasonable prospects for economic recovery and growth' but 
that it would be impossible, in 1974 alone, for Pinochet to 'regain all the ground lost during 
the previous regime.''l46 
Table 3.4 demonstrates that Canadian exports and imports from Chile increased 
throughout the military dictatorship. The low levels of trade in 1972 reflect Canada's limited 
interest in Chile at that time and helps explain why Ottawa did not react to the military coup 
in 1973. Canadian trade with Chile has dramatically increased since then. 
~~Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 101. 
'"'Ibid., 93-94. 
Table 3.4 
Canadian Exports and Imports from Chile47 
Canadian Exports and Imports from Chile 
(millions$ Canadian) 
1972197519781980198219851988199019911992 
• Exports • Imports 
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Source: Statistics Canada, Exports: Merchandise Trade, Cat 65-202, various years; Canada 
Year Book of Industry Trade and Commerce, various years; Imports: Merchandise Trade, 
65-203, various years. 
Table 3.5 illustrates Canadian official development assistance to Chile between 1970 
and 1990. There was a drop in bilateral aid to Chile in 1973 because: "once again Canada 
acted quietly, making no public statement to the effect that this initiative was prompted by 
human rights considerations. Further, as in the other cutbacks, the aid program in Chile had 
always been smal1."48 Canadian assistance to Chile increased dramatically during the 1980s. 
47Ibid., 239, 242. 
48Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity", 247. 
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Canadian Official Development Assistance to Chile49 
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Decline of the Military Government 
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Open opposition to the military regime became evident during the 1981-82 economic 
crisis. Opposition began in social organizations that were able to develop ooder Pinochet as 
they were relatively isolated from repression. Notable among these were groups linked to 
49Ibid., 246. 
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the Catholic church. Philip Oxhom suggests that authoritarian rule, depending on the extent 
of repression, can either prevent the emergence of civil society, or provide the conditions for 
its development.50 In Chile, it created the conditions for the strengthening of these 
organizations which became an effective opposition to the regime. 
The economic crisis of 1981-82 hit the lower classes of society the hardest. 
Workers, women, youth, and the poor organized so that they could express their interests and 
help one another. The common thread uniting these groups was their desire for Pinochet to 
step down. It was also important that since Chile had become a democracy before the 
military coup, many citizens had organizational experience and remembered what life was 
like in a democracy. 
The reappearance of civil society during the early 1980s provoked a reemergence of 
political parties. Except for the Communists, excluded because they would not renounce 
violence, parties that were previously separated by their ideological differences coalesced 
into the Democratic Alliance (AD). The AD wanted to work within the existing rules to re-
establish democracy and believed that violence would delegitimize their efforts. A 
document, known as the National Accord, outlined the party's intentions and called for 
Pinochet' s resignation. 
Another political party coalition, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) became 
the United Left (IU). It was made up of groups who were excluded from the Democratic 
50philip Oxhom. Organizing Civil Society, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) 5-6. 
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Alliance: The Communists, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, another Socialist 
faction, Chispa, and the Movement for United Popular Action.51 Unlike the AD, the IU 
wanted to overthrow Pinochet via mass mobilization. 
The AD, operating within the laws that Pinochet enacted, called for a presidential 
plebiscite in 1988. If the AD had used an illegal method or violence, it would have provided 
an excuse for the military to repress it. Pinochet's acceptance of the plebiscite was a result 
of US pressure. Although the US had initially supported Pinochet, the US ·•came to fear 
seriously that another Nicaragua might develop if deep polarization remained between the 
government headed by General Augusto Pinochet and most civilian political groups."52 
Therefore, the US provided economic aid and support to the AD and ''worked actively for 
a fair plebiscite in 1988 in accord with Chile's constitution."53 It is interesting to note that 
Canada did not play a role in Chile's plebiscite, during a time when Ottawa's rhetoric was 
focused on hwnan rights and democratization. Although it could have been a result of 
Canada staying out of US business, it also suggests a lack of interest in Chile by Ottawa. 
The plebiscite asked citizens whether or not they supported the military regime. 
Once Pinochet legalized political parties (with many restrictions) the opposition began its 
"Lois Hecht Oppenheim. Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and the Search for Development. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) 182. 
52Christopher Mitchell. ·• U.S. Policy Toward Western Hemisphere Immigration and Human Rights." 
United States Policy in Latin America: A Debate of Crisis and Challenge. ed. John D. Martz. (London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1995) 290. 
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campaign. The US also pressured Pinochet to keep the plebiscite free and fair. The result 
showed opposition receiving 55 percent of the vote to Pinochet's 44 percent. 
In December 1989, elections were held for the new civilian government. "Less than 
two years before the election, President Pinochet enjoyed virtually unchallenged authority, 
while the opposition was in disarray. The economy had recovered from the slump of 1981-
82, and in comparison with most other economies in Latin America, the Chilean one was a 
success story."s4 The opposition from the 1988 plebiscite formed the Concertacion para la 
Democracia led by Patricio Aylwin who won the election with 55 percent of the vote and 
held a majority in the lower house, with 70 out of 120 seats.ss He did not, however, carry the 
Senate, for reasons discussed below. 
Unlike other Latin American countries, the Chilean economy was not in ruins, but 
was growing. In 1989, Chile was the leading per capita exporter in Latin America; there was 
a favourable balance of trade; the foreign debt was under control; foreign investment was 
high; and industries were expanding. 56 Alywin successfully managed the economy during 
'~Alan Angell and Benny Pollack, .. Elections and Politics in Chile, 1988-1992," The Legacy of 
Dictatorship: Political, Economic and Social Change in Pinochet's Chile. ed. A. Angell and B. Pollack. (Institute of 
Latin American Studies: The University of Liverpool, Monograph Series, No.1 7) 1. 
"Paul W. Drake and Ivan Jaksic, ·•Introduction: Transformation and Transition in Chile, 1982-1990," The 
Struggle for Democracy in Chile /982-/990. ed. P. Drake and I. Jaksic. (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 
1991) 13-14. 
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his term. Inflation in 1993 was 12.7 percent, tmemployment was 4.3 percent and productivity 
was high. 57 The success of the economy added legitimacy to the transition. 
Problems and Prospects of Chilean Democracy 
Chile's transition to democracy has been relatively successful as illustrated by free 
and fair elections in 1989 and 1993, and many social and political rights have been restored. 
However, the consolidation of democracy is not complete as many anti-democratic holdovers 
from the 1980 Constitution remain. It was difficult for the newly elected civilian government 
to enact reforms as ''the powerful Chilean private sector accepted the return of democracy 
only after the forces opposing Pinochet committed themselves to respecting its interests. 
[And] according to a prominent hypothesis in the literature on regime transitions, such 
constraints prevent a new democracy from enacting reforms that could offend business. "58 
The 1980 Constitution embodies Pinochet's vision of a 'protected' democracy that was 
restricted in nature. Other anti-democratic holdovers from the Pinochet regime include: the 
military remains outside civilian control; there are nine appointed Senators; Wlpunished 
human rights violations; and electoral laws that distort the electorate's will. These factors 
impede the elected civilian government from pursuing policies and instituting reforms that 
would further consolidate democracy. 
170ppenheim. Politics in Chile, 225. 
'
1Kurt Weyland. .. Growth and Equity in Chile's New Democracy", Latin American Research Review 52, 
no.l ( 1997) 38. 
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The Constitution of 1980 embodies Pinochet's desire to create a 'protected' 
democracy which would "replace 'the neutral and defenceless classic, Liberal state with one 
committed to the values of the liberty and dignity of individuals and the essential values of 
our nationhood."5" This system is highly presidentalist, (Articles 62 and 64f. Before 
leaving office, Pinochet accepted constitutional reforms that removed some of the most 
objectionable features of the constitution, by slightly reducing the control of the executive 
over Congress, and making amendments to the constitution somewhat easier.61 However, 
the framework of the Constitution retains undemocratic elements. 
To further consolidate democracy the military needs to be brought under civilian 
control. The civilian government has no control over appointments or removal of army 
officers and commanders. This allows the military to determine its own future and be 
unaccountable to the citizenry. It creates an atmosphere of fear and causes the civilian 
government to be very careful about reformist proposals. 
The 1980 Constitution, like some others in Latin America, grants the armed forces 
·reserve power', which gives them the ability to come to "the defense of the fatherland, 
national security, and the institutional order of the republic.'>62 The Constitution also created 
'~ark Ensalaco, ••Jn with the New, Out with the Old? The Democratising Impact of Constitutional Reform 
in Chile." Journal of Latin American Studies 26. part 2, (1994) 411. 
00Jorge Nefand Nibaldo Galleguillos, .. Legislatures and Democratic Transitions in Latin America: The 
Chilean Case . ., Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America, ed. David Close. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995) 118. 
61 Angell, "The Transition to Democracy in Chile", 569. 
~ef and Galleguillos, "Legislatures and Democratic Transitions in Latin America", 119. 
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a National Security Council, dominated by the military, that advises the President on matters 
relating to national security.63 The Council has the ability to 'represent' its opinions in front 
of any government institution, which means the armed forces can "lawfully appeal to any 
government body that might share their views on national security.·~ 
Nine appointed senators remain from the Pinochet government. They are ·•supposed 
to embody Pinochet' s vision of a 'technified democracy' in which the voice of experts would 
enjoy a privileged hearing.'>6s These senators constrain Chilean democracy as they block 
many reforms coming from the democratically elected government. The Senate became the 
centre of even more controversy on March ll, 1998 when General Pinochet stepped down 
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and took a lifetime Senate seat. Pinochet's new 
position as a senator has provoked political debate. The right supports Pinochet's move as 
''it seemed perfectly natural and that he would be a great help in discussing the country's 
laws, given his role in reforming its institutions as president.'~6 Others argue that no 
politician should be in power who is not freely elected by the people.67 
Redress of past human rights violations is important for the consolidation of 
democracy because it represents that the new civilian governments recognizes past abuses. 
63Ensalaco, ··In with the New, Out with the Old?" 422. 
(>4Ibid., 423. 
6
'Ibid., 419. 
o6CHIP Ne'\VS. ''Pinochet Considering Senatorship." Source: El Mercurio. March 3, 1997; 
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up in May 1990 to investigate 
human rights violations committed during the Pinochet regime. [n March 1991, the 
Commission published the Rettig Report. This Report "analysed the behaviour of the 
security services, the armed forces and the judiciary, and proposed a series of measures to 
ensure that this situation could not be repeated.''l68 The Report stated that a total of 2,279 
people were killed and "over half were between the ages of sixteen and thirty, and 46 percent 
had no known party affiliation. •'!69 
Despite the Rettig Report's revelations, the government was slow to react because 
the Senate blocked reforms. Further inhibiting the government's response was the 1978 
Amnesty Law that protects the military from persecution. Then in May 1993 the military 
took to the streets to show its opinion of government attempts to strip it of its impunity. 
Manual Garreton states that the agenda for human rights should be to reform the two 
institutions that allowed the violations to occur: the military and the judiciary.70 He argues 
that: .. These reforms link the two aspects ·Nunca Mas', that which refer to the past and its 
causes, and that which refer to the future and the conditions that will preclude a repetition 
61Manuel Antonio Garreton . .. Human Rights in the Process of Democratization.,. Journal of Latin American 
Studies 26,(1994) 227. 
6410ppenhei.m, Politics in Chile, 217. 
70Garreton. .. Human Rights in the Process of Democratization", 232. 
92 
of the past."71 It is important for the new civilian government to address past human rights 
abuses. However given blocks for further reforms, this will be a slow process. 
Prior to stepping down as President in 1989, Pinochet enacted the binominal electoral 
law, which mandates double-member districts to elect 120 deputies and 38 senators.72 
Pinochet believed that the electoral system prior to 1973 created highly ideologically divided 
political parties. He wanted to create an electoral system that would prevent ideological 
divides between parties, while it benefited the right. The system's advocates claim that it 
builds cooperation between political parties and brings ideologies closer to the centre.73 
This was demonstrated by the formation of a coalition of parties known as the 
Concertacion para Ia Democracia that formed in 1989. However, the Concertation leaders 
argued: ''that the binominal system, contrary to its stated aims, actually promotes 
intracoalition miswtderstanding and disunity."'" The Concertation's partners argued that 
negotiating with each other, to compose candidate lists is labourious. 75 Critics of the 
electoral system also argue that it distorts voter preference and benefits third place winners. 
The elections of 1989 and 1993 illustrated that Pinochet's objectives were fulfilled. 
The percentage of seats won by the right were out of proportion with the electoral votes. 
71 Ibid., 232 
r:Rhoda Rabkin. ·•Redemocratization. Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989-1995". 
Comparative Political Studies 29, no.3 (1996) 336. 
'Tllbid.. 336. 
74Ibid., 345. 
751bid., 345. 
93 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 clearly show that the number of votes did not correspond to the number 
of seats won. 
1989 
Coalition of Parties 
for Democracy 
(CPO): P. Aylwin 
Right Parties: 
H. Buchi 
Independent Right: 
F .J. Errazuriz 
Table 3.676 
Presidential Election Results, 1989 and 1993 
(percentage of valid votes) 
55.17 
29.40 
15.43 
1993 
CPD: E. Frei 58.01 
Other Left Candidates: 
M. Max-Neff 5.55 
E. Pizarro 4.69 
C. Reitze 1.17 
Right Parties: 
A. Alessandri 
Independent Right: 
J. Pinera 
24.39 
6.18 
Source: Munck, ··Authoritarianism, Modernization. and Democracy in Chile". 4. 
Table 3.6 illustrates that in both the 1989 and 1993 elections the CPD won the 
election with the highest percentage ofvotes, 55.17% and 58.01% respectively. Table 3.7 
illustrates that although the CPD won the highest percentage of votes, it ''did not translate 
into control of the Congress.''77 This happened ·•even though Concertacion (CPO) 
candidates for the Chamber of Deputies garnered 55.42% of all valid votes compared to only 
70Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Stability and Its Limits: An Analysis of Chile's 1993 Elections." Journal 
of lnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no.2, (1994) 4. 
11Munck. .. Democratic Stability and Its Limits", 9. 
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36.56% for the UPC candidates on the Right, the CPD was still only able to hang onto its 
previous majority of70 seats (out of 120)."78 
Table 3.779 
The Makeup of Congress~ 1989 and 1993 
(number of seats) 
Deputies Senators Deputies Senators 
Center-left Coalition 
Coalition of Parties for 
Democracy {CPD)10 
PDC 39 13 37 13 
PS 18 4 15 5 
PPD 7 1 15 2 
PR 6 3 2 
so 1 
POI 1 
Subtotal 70 22 70 21 
Left Coalition 
MIDA 2 
Right Coalitions and Allies 
RN 32 13 29 11 
UDl 14 ., 15 3 ... 
ucc 2 
Independents 2 1 4 3 
Designated" 8 8 
Subtotal 48 24 50 25 
Total 120 46 120 46 
Source: Munck. ··Authoritarianism, Modernization. and Democracy in Chile:· 9. 
71Ibid., 9. 
19Ibid., p9 
~e acronyms used are: Christian Democrats (PDC); the Socialist (PS); the Partido porIa Democracia 
{PPD); the Partido Radical (PR); Social Democracia (SD); the Partida Democratico de Jzquierda (POI); the 
Movimiento de Jzquierda Democratico Allendista (MIDA); the Renovacian Naciona/ (RN); the Union Democratica 
/ndependiente (UDI); and the Union de Centro Centro (UCC). 
"The number of designated senators was reduced to eight due to the death of one of the appointed Senators. 
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The 'over- representation' of the right in Congress is caused by the binominal 
electoral system as well as from the appointed Senators. Although the governing coalition 
in both elections won a majority of votes, they did not win a majority of Senate seats. This 
was Pinochet' s intent. 
... (W)hile the largest electoral bloc would have to gain more than two-thirds of the 
votes to win both seats in each distric4 the second-largest bloc can win one of every 
two contested seats with just over a third of the votes. In the Chilean context, this 
means - as the architects of the system intended - that the Right, which historically 
has received only a third of the vote, would be over- represented in the Congress.8: 
As a result, the electorate's will is not being fairly represented in Chamber of Deputies or the 
Senate. Critics have argued that the electoral system is a destabilizing factor because it is 
too sensitive to small vote shifts.83 The right has used its gains from the electoral system to 
frustrate further democratization, for example by blocking reforms involving civil-military 
relations, tax laws, electoral laws, and reforms to the judiciary. 
Despite the anti-democratic holdovers from the Pinochet regime, both the Alywin and 
Frei governments have had some successes. The Aylwin government increased social 
spending, made minor changes to the tax system, and increased the health budget.84 The Frei 
govemmen4 in power since 1993, has also attempted to improve social conditions as the 
government's main priorities are to eradicate poverty, achieve a higher standard of living, 
12Ibid., I 0. 
13Rabkin. ''Redemocratization., Electoral Engineering, and Party Strategies in Chile, 1989- 1995." 348. 
"'Angell, -The Transition to Democracy", 565. 
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reform education and the health system. Poverty levels fell from 40 percent in 1989 to 28.5 
percent in 1995; however income distribution remains highly unequal.85 Furthermore the 
government has emphasized improved productivity, skills upgrading and diversification to 
higher value added exports. 
Both governments have maintained the economic growth begun under the Pinochet 
regime and at the same time have addressed the grave social problems created by the 
dictatorship. In 1995 GOP grew 8.4 percent, up from 4.3 percent in 1994, and inflation fell 
from 8.9 percent in 1994 to 8.2 percent in 1995.86 In 1994 Chile was the only Latin American 
country with an 'investment grade Single A minus' debt rating, the first with an 'Al' from 
the European rating agency ffiCA, and had received a record US$4.3 billion of foreign 
investment.87 Capital investment reached a high of 30.7 percent of GDP in 1995 with 
·•investment averaging 28.1% per annum over the last years. In 1995 investment reached 6% 
of GOP; Canada accounted for 33.8% of all authorized foreign investment in Chile, an 
increase of almost 200% over 1994."88 
~Chip News. "'Poverty on the Decline." July 9/97. Sow-ce: El Mercurio; La Nacion. 
[hnp://www.chip.cV/news/searchlbold.pl?c:\www .chipenews\1997\ 7\9\nl.html&refonns] 
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Conclusion 
Although the Aylwin and Frei governments have had some successes in social and 
economic policies, there remains social inequalities which create discontent. Despite 
economic growth, the government has not adequately addressed issues of poverty and income 
inequalities.89 As Felipe Aguero point out: "income inequality has continued to grow, 
placing Chile among the historically worst cases of inequality in Latin America: Brazil, 
Guatarnala. and Honduras. The freest and most competitive economy in Latin America has 
become also one of the most inegalitarian. "-x> An increase in dissatisfaction could result in 
the population looking elsewhere for solutions. This could lead to a breakdown in Chile's 
democratic transition. 
The effects of the CCFTA on Chile's future consolidation of democracy are 
uncertain. However, Ottawa has decided that it would ignore these issues and capitalize on 
the economic advantages that will arise from a bilateral free trade agreement. The lack of 
democratic intent in the free trade agreement suggests that Canada endorses a free trade 
agreement that is ultimately flawed, because it fails to address domestic democratic issues 
which could cause political and economic instability. Potential political and economic 
instability in Chile could accentuate weaknesses in the free trade agreement, such as the 
labour and environmental side agreements. In tum, this could affect the free trade agreement 
and have a negative economic impact on Canada. 
~'~felipe Aguero, "Chile's Lingering Authoritarin Legacy", Cu"ent History 91, no.616, (1998) 68. 
9CI"fuid., 68. 
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Conclusion 
The consolidation of democracy in Chile is not secured. yet the Canadian government 
moved ahead and signed a bilateral free trade agreement that lacks democratic content. 
Authoritarian holdovers from the Pinochet regime retard democratic consolidation, which 
in tum threatens the nations's future economic growth and prosperity. Now that it has a free 
trade agreement with Chile, Canada also bas a vested interest in Santiago's democratic 
development and respect for hwnan rights. Democracy is good for economic development, 
and "there is a growing appreciation that the fostering of democratic processes in 
government and society contributes to economic development by releasing creative energies, 
enhancing accountability, and deepening participation."' However, Ottawa failed to 
recognize the link between economic development, on the one hand, and human rights and 
democratic development, on the other. 
This thesis has sought to explain why the CCFT A ignores democracy and why 
Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s does not place a higher priority on human rights and 
democracy promotion, as one would have expected from the initiatives of the 1980s. The 
first chapter explored the concept of regionalism as the motivation behind Ottawa to sign a 
bilateral free trade agreement with Chile. The world economy has moved to the formation 
of trade blocs which have reduced traditional markets for Canada, such as the European 
'Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 21. 
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markets now that the EU is in place. Canada's dependency on the US as an export market 
has also left Canada in a vulnerable position if the US decided to implement protectionist 
measures. Therefore, Canada seeks to secure its position in the world economy by looking 
for alternative non-traditional markets, for example in Latin America were democratization 
and economic growth have stimulated interest in regional integration. Latin American 
countries have presented themselves as possible partners for regional integration as there 
have been moves toward democratization and their economies have improved. 
Ottawa has been and continues to be an active promoter of regional economic 
integration and continues to be despite the limited success of the EAI, the waning support 
in the US for the FT AA, and the skepticism of some Latin American governments toward 
a hemispheric economy. In 1990, US President Bush introduced the EAI which was 
supposed to support and facilitate economic changes in Latin America and establish a FT AA 
by 2005. The objective of the initiative was to facilitate the necessary economic changes in 
Latin American countries so that they would be prepared to meet the obligations of a free 
trade agreement. The waning support of the US and the skepticism of many Latin American 
governments were the causes of the lack of success for the EAI. The US has moved toward 
more protectionist measures after NAFT A, as illustrated by the failure of Chile's accession 
to NAFTA to be fast-tracked through US Congress. Chile's failure also created worries that 
other Latin American economies will not be permitted to enter into a free trade agreement 
with the US. Some Latin American governments are also wary ofthe costs of a regional free 
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trade arrangement after they witnessed the social and political crisis that erupted in Mexico 
shortly after the signing ofNAFTA. 
Despite the waning interest by some governments in the Americas in the creation of 
a FT AA, there are other governments which continue to pursue it because they believe it will 
bring economic benefits to their country. As a result, there is a patchwork of multilateral 
trade agreements, such as MERCOSUR, the ANDEAN Pact, CARICOM, CACM, and 
NAFT A, as well as a number of bilateral trade agreements between various countries. 
Ottawa wanted to expand economic integration as a way to secure its economic and 
trade interests and Chile presented itself as the next likely candidate for a free trade deal as 
its economic growth was the most dynamic in Latin America and it was undergoing a 
transition to democracy. Chile's associate membership in Mercosur may also give Canada 
a window to that organization, which would give Canada access to the rich markets in South 
America. Trade between Canada and Chile has dramatically increased in the past few years 
and Chile's resource-based export economy provides ample opportunities for Canadian 
investors. For Chile, Canada provides expertise and knowledge in export industries, such 
as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, information technology and telecommunications, mining, 
and power and energy. Canada's decision to pursue a bilateral free trade agreement with 
Chile was a result of Chile's failure to be fast-tracked through US Congress. Ottawa wanted 
to continue with economic integration despite the participation of the US as Ottawa did not 
want to lose out on the economic benefits of a free trade agreement with Chile. The CCFT A 
will promote business and investment in these sectors for both countries. 
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Chapter One also examined the CCFT A in order to determine if there was any 
concern about human rights and democracy in Chile when the agreement was under 
negotiation. The negotiations were held in secret and not much information is available on 
the process.! However, what is known is that the negotiations were conducted under the 
direction of the DF AIT and the Minister of International Trade. Each of these departments 
receives advice from industrial lobbyists and two appointed bodies: the International Trade 
Advisory Committee and a number of Sectoral Advisory Groups on International Trade.3 
Advisory bodies are heavily weighted with representatives from the corporate sector:' Other 
interest groups and non-governmental organizations had Little input during the negotiations. 
The vital role the corporate sector played in shaping the CCFT A suggests that little 
consideration was given to human rights and democracy issues because such issues are 
irrelevant to business interests. 
The CCFT A does include labour and environmental side agreements which suggests 
that Ottawa may have concerns about labour rights and environmental protection in Chile. 
However, a closer examination suggests that they are not a plan of action to protect labour 
and the environment. There is no evidence to suggest that these side agreements were 
intended to pressure the Chilean government to reform its labour and environmental laws. 
Environmental groups in Chile believe that the CCFT A will produce greater environmental 
2Robinson. lnterview. 
1Ibid. 
~Ibid. 
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costs as enforceable clauses are absent from the body of the agreement.5 In sum, the CCFTA 
lacks democratic intent and this may reinforce the inequalities and the undemocratic 
characteristics of the Chilean system. 
Chapter 2 examined Canadian foreign policy rhetoric in the 1980s to consider the 
claim Ottawa places a high priority on human rights and democracy issues in its foreign 
policies. During the 1980s, official government statements and parliamentary reports on 
Canadian foreign policy emphasized these issues. Central America and South Africa are 
examples of how Canadian foreign policy rhetoric contradicted Ottawa's actions. 
Ottawa perceived the instability in Central America to be linked to the political, 
social, and economic problems that plagued the region. The US, on the other hand, believed 
that instability was a result of the East-West conflict and therefore was a direct threat to US 
security. Ottawa's foreign policy rhetoric pursued the idea that peace and security in Central 
America could be achieved through peaceful means, .. namely, human rights, trade and 
investment, development assistance and security.'16 However, Ottawa's actions in Central 
America did not live up to its rhetoric. Although, the government of Canada stated that it 
objected to the militarization of the region, it was careful not to directly criticize the US, its 
largest trading partner. 
Ottawa's actions in Central America reveal a foreign policy guided by the principles 
of economic self-interest rather than by humanitarian and democratic concerns. Further, by 
'Chilean Action Network, ·•Open Letter from Chile to Canadian Parliamentarians". 6. 
6External Affairs and National Defence, "'Final Report", 8. 
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comparing Canada's actions to those of the 'like-minded' states, which, generally speaking, 
provided more assistance to the region, it exposes a foreign policy that is dominated by 
economic and trade interests. Canada also had economic interest in the region, therefore 
Ottawa was concerned about maintaining stability in order to protect its trade. 7 The like-
minded states, consisting of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Australia, 
Belgium, Finland, France, and Ireland generally considered the problems in Central America 
related to the political, social, and economic instability and their actions were consistent with 
their policy rhetoric. For example, Spain, France, Denmark and Sweden were .. more 
generous with export credits and financing to Nicaragua than. •• Canada. "11 Canada's actions 
in Central America were confusing and contradictory which weakened any positive influence 
that Canadian foreign policy may have had. 
Canada's refugee and aid policies also sent mixed messages to the governments and 
citizens in Central America. Initially, Canada's refugee policy was open to those fleeing 
from violence in Central America. However, after changes in US immigration laws that 
would have sent an influx of Central American refugees to Canada, Canada quickly amended 
its laws to limit the number of refugees.9 This suggests that the Canadian government was 
willing to go only so far to accommodate humanitarian concerns. Mixed signals also 
characterized Canada's aid policy, Ottawa initially cut bilateral assistance to El Salvador and 
7Rochlin. Discovering the Americas, 127. 
1Lemco. Canada and the Crisis in Central America, 58. 
~orth. Between War and Peace, 51. 
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Guatemala because of human rights violations. 10 However, Ottawa renewed aid to both 
countries in 1984 and 1987, respectively, despite the continuation of human rights 
violations. 11 
South Africa is another example of Canadian action not meeting the standards of its 
rhetoric. The increase in violence in South Africa became an issue for the Canadian 
government in the 1980s. The black majority of South Africa was reacting to the 
oppression created by the white minority government and its apartheid policies. The 
Mulroney government responded by threatening extensive economic sanctions against South 
Africa ifits domestic policies went wtchanged. The partial economic sanctions implemented 
by Mulroney had little effect as trade between the two cowttries was insignificant. 12 Although 
no changes took place in South Africa, the Mulroney government failed to implement total 
economic sanctions. Humanitarian concerns took a back seat to other issues as the Mulroney 
government was preparing for another federal election and was seeking a free trade 
agreement with the US. 
Chapter two also looked at Mexico and NAFT A. Previous concerns about human 
rights and democracies issues displayed by the Canadian government in its rhetoric toward 
Central America and South Africa ended there. Although the importance of trade has always 
been a concern in foreign policy making, it came to the forefront in the late 1980s and early 
1 ~ochlin. Discovering the Americas, 126. 
"North, Between War and Peace, 99-102. 
12Adam and Moodley, Democratizing Southern Africa, 38. 
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1990s as Canada sought to expand regional economic integration in the Americas, beginning 
with Mexico. This was a response to changes in the world economy. The end of the Cold 
War, globalization, and the expansion of transnational corporations, convinced Ottawa to 
focus on the importance oftrade in its foreign policy. Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s 
stresses the importance of trade in democratic development as it "persists with the fiction that 
foreign trade is the best way to achieve global security, respect for human rights, and 
democratic development." 13 This lack of concern for human rights and democracy in Mexico 
helps to explain why the CCFT A ignores questions of democracy. 
Mexico and Chile are similar in the sense that authoritarian elements in their political 
and economic system did not concern the Canadian government during the negotiations of 
both free trade deals. Canada did not want to be left out of the trade deal between the US 
and Mexico because it would benefit US businesses to have access to all markets. Despite 
the authoritarian nature of the Mexican political system and the human rights violations, 
poverty, social inequalities. and envirorunental degradation that mark that country's record, 
Ottawa continued to push economic integration. Critics argue that by not conditioning the 
free trade agreement on democratic improvements, it reinforces the authoritarian elements 
in their country by benefitting the ruling oligarchy and big business. 14 
13Irving Brecher, ''Canadian Foreign Policy: 'Show me the Money'", Behind the Headlines. 55, no.l, 
(1997) 9. 
1 
.. Dosman, Beyond Mexico, 95. 
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By neglecting the importance of democratic development and respect for human 
rights in Mexico, NAFT A may be undermined. This was illustrated by the social, political, 
and economic crisis that began after the implementation ofNAFT A. The economic, social 
and political crisis in Mexico therefore provides an example of a coWltry that did not 
adequately address democratic development and human rights issues during a period of 
economic growth and integration. 
Canada's decision to expand free trade to Mexico took place within the context of 
regional economic integration. However, regional integration has occurred only at the 
economic level, and has not extended into social, and security policies, as has happened in 
Europe. The inequalities that persist where integration is only economic leaves '"domestic 
policies in place, policies which can be equivalent non-tariff barriers (NTBs)." 15 Addressing 
such non-tariff barriers in Mexico requires changes to the political system; a subject which 
the Canadian government has avoided. This illustrates that not only is it ethically and morally 
important for Canada to promote human rights and democratic development in Chile, it is 
also in Canada's best long-term economic interests. 
Chapter three took a brieflook at Chilean history, the 1973 military coup, Pinochet's 
economic recovery policies, the 1989 plebiscite, and the issues that surroWld Chile's 
transition to democracy. It also highlights Canada's reaction to significant events in Chilean 
history. To understand why it is important for the Canadian government to consider 
uwaverman. "Post NAFTA", 56. 
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democratic development and the promotion of human rights in Chile, one must look at the 
authoritarian hold-overs from the Pinochet regime and see how they may affect democratic 
stability. 
The democratic tradition in Chile extends back at least to 1932. Between 1932 and 
1973 Chile was a restricted democracy in the sense that participation by the popular classes 
as it was controlled by the upper class. A growing ideological division between political 
parties, in conjunction with reforms to the electoral system in 1958, threatened the upper 
class as their economic interests were threatened. The election of a Christian Democrat, 
Eduardo Frei, in 1964 was a turning point in Chilean history as more groups were given 
access to the political system, diluting the elite's political influence. 
This was the setting in which the Marxist Salvador Allende, a Unidad Popular 
Candidate, won the presidential election in 1970. However, Allende's attempts to transform 
Chile into a socialist state, angered those on the right in Chile; the US and less importantly 
Canada. Therefore, in 1973, a bloody coup lead by General Augusto Pinochet, with 
Washington's blessing, overthrew the Allende government. 
For sixteen years, Chile was governed by a repressive military dictatorship. Canada 
said little about the coup because Ottawa disliked Allende, and quickly recognized the 
military government. Canada's aid policy also represents a lack of concern for democracy 
in Chile because its development assistance continued to pour in throughout the Pinochet 
years. Although Canada did accept a large number of Chilean refugees, this policy should 
be viewed as a reaction to public pressure. Initially, Ottawa and the Canadian embassy in 
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Chile were slow to react to requests for asylum, and did not do so tmtil public pressure 
increased. 
Repressive and anti-democratic though the dictatorship was, Pinochet' s economic 
reforms created one of the most dynamic economies in Latin America. Exports, imports, and 
foreign investment steadily increased in the late 1980s; however, economic growth was 
occurring at the expense of poor and lower classes. Poverty, illiteracy, income disparities, 
and social inequalities increased as the Pinochet regime and its corporate allies reaped the 
benefits of economic growth. Political parties, which emerged from the grass-roots 
movements of the early eighties, challenged him to a presidential plebiscite in 1989. 
Pinochet, under pressure from the US to respect the electoral outcome, agreed. Pinochet lost 
the election, therefore Chile's transition to democracy was tmderway. In the 1989 general 
election in 1989 the dictatorship's support lost momentum. 
Although Chile continues to have economic success and has been democratizing 
since 1989, the consolidation of democracy is far from complete. Anti-democratic hold-overs 
from the Pinochet regime loom in the backgrotmd, threatening Chile's future democratic and 
economic stability. These anti-democratic hold-overs originate in the 1980 Constitution 
which reflects Pinochet's model of a 'restrictive' democracy. Other examples are the lack 
of civilian control over the military; the existence of nine appointed Senators; Pinochet's 
own status as a life-time Senator; past human rights violations that have not been adequately 
addressed; and an electoral system that distorts the electorate's will. If these anti -democratic 
hold-overs are not resolved it could result in widespread domestic unrest. There are signs 
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of this already in a protest vote during the 1993 elections, and by the fact that labour conflict 
is on the rise.16 
Canada's decision to enter into a free trade agreement with Chile without making it 
conditional on further democratization puts Canada in a vulnerable position if domestic 
instability in Chile leads to economic instability. The link between economic and democratic 
development is illustrated by three examples suggested by David Gillies. First, ·•one 
empirical study fowtd a positive correlation among three indices: "freedom," per capita 
product, and the quality-of-life index." 17 Second, .. another found that democratic stability and 
··civil and political rights cannot prevail if socio-economic rights are ignored."" 18 Third, •'the 
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) found that countries with high levels of political 
freedom (civil and political rights) also produced high human development indices." 19 
Ottawa's decision to put less emphasis on democratic development and human rights 
issues in its foreign policy in the 1990s derives from its acceptance of the still unproven 
claim that trade will indirectly promote democratic development, which in turn will foster 
respect for human rights. This thinking also reflects the ideas of the realist school of 
international relations, as the government defends its promotion of trade over democracy by 
claiming that domestic issues are the responsibility of the sovereign state and that we have 
16Aguero, .. Chile's Lingering Authoritarin Legacy", 68-69. 
17Gillies. Between Principle and Practice, 20. 
11Jbid. 20. 
'"Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 20. 
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no business interfering in other countries affairs. Ottawa thus discmmts the argument that 
sovereignty "must not be used to excuse the "inept or malevolent practices of 
governments. "20 
Ottawa's desire to further Canada's position in the Americas; the gap between 
Ottawa's foreign policy rhetoric in the 1980s and its actions; the lack of response to 
democratic and human rights issues in Mexico; the historical lack of concern for domestic 
issues in Chile; and Ottawa's focus on trade in the 1990s, all help explain why the CCFTA 
lacks democratic intent or content. The government of Canada has refused to jeopardize 
economic and trade interests for the sake of protecting human rights and democratic 
development abroad. This is also exemplified by Canada's trade and economic relations 
with "'such notorious human rights violators as Cuba, Indonesia, and China."21 
Ottawa's actions reveal a foreign policy that was self-interested and careful not to 
jeopardize economic and trade interests. The Canadian government would not press hard for 
human rights and democracy promotion. The change in rhetoric in the 1990s emphasizing 
towards the importance of trade in development can be explained by a decline in public 
involvement in the shaping of our foreign policy. 
Canada's foreign policy in the 1990s is therefore an extension of the policies of the 
1980s. A reduction in public interest in Canadian foreign policy (as compared to the public's 
reaction to the Central American crisis) allows Ottawa to ignore the calls from civil society. 
20Ibid., 28 
21 Brecher. "Canadian Foreign Policy". 7. 
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The result is the corporate sector plays a much larger role in the shaping of our foreign 
policy. Ottawa still pursues a self-interested foreign policy to secure its trade and investment 
interests in order to preserve the 'national' interest. The 'national' interest being 'economic' 
interests. However, it is impossible to understand how our 'national' interests are being 
protected when Ottawa does not consider what long-term impact its foreign policies will 
have on Canada. Greater public involvement in the shaping of our foreign policy could force 
the government to take a more 'democratic' line. 
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